

AFGANISTAN

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: General Donovan
 through Director, SI
 FROM: Colonel O'Connor *jc*
 SUBJECT: Plan for Afghanistan

DATE: September 4, 1948

We have endeavored to promote a mining enterprise and an oil exploration party in Afghanistan to provide cover for OSS personnel. The recently-arrived Afghan Minister has expressed interest in such projects. However, the outlay involved and the unlikelihood of early returns on such investment have deterred any of the various companies interviewed from going ahead at this time. Subsequently, the Carnegie Institution and the Smithsonian Institute were approached with the intention of fostering a survey party for geologic, archaeologic, or geographical purposes. These overtures are continuing. After my talk with you it appears feasible to organize a mining survey party who could initiate explorations for strategic minerals, the whole expense being under \$100,000 per year. This will enable four parties in different parts of the country, three to the north along the Russian border and one in the south along the Iran or Indian borders, with headquarters in Kabul.

If the Afghan Minister will issue approval for this survey mission, with advantages accruing to the Afghans in the shape of technical data as acquired, an agreed export tax on any minerals shipped, and with no exploration nor development expense to be borne by the Afghans, such an enterprise could be inaugurated at once.

It may be advisable to obtain sponsorship of an established mining company in order to use their name and to initiate arrangements with the Afghans; this also being possible through the friendship of Clapp or Hart who are well known to the present Minister. Personnel with mining qualifications have been interviewed and can be organized at once, preferably as soon as the project is written up and approved. The outlay should not total more than \$150/200,000 over a 2-year period.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRETMarch 6, 1942
*File*MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel William J. Donovan

From: G. T. Robinson and J. A. Morrison

Subject: Establishing Diplomatic Relations with
Afghanistan

We wish to call your attention to a matter bearing directly on the supply of Russia from the south.

You may recall that before he left Washington for the Near East, Mr. Bullitt had a conference in Mr. Ailey's office with certain members of C.O.I. who are concerned with the countries he planned to visit. On that occasion Mr. Wright and Mr. Morrison urged the view that this country should establish direct diplomatic relations with Afghanistan as soon as possible. It was pointed out that the shipment of supplies to Russia through Afghanistan, under American supervision, would be greatly expedited if there were an American diplomatic mission in Kabul. It was also suggested that in view of the Axis propaganda in Afghanistan and the Afghans' deep-rooted suspicion of both Russia and England, the desire of the Afghans for direct diplomatic relations with this country -- a desire attested by a number of reliable sources -- should be met by the appointment of a suitably qualified American Minister Plenipotentiary.

Mr. Bullitt appeared to be impressed with this suggestion and asked for a memorandum on the subject. Since that time, there have been some indications that the matter has been taken under advisement, but direct diplomatic relations with this strategically very important Asiatic country are not yet a reality.

A cable from Minister Dreyfus in Tehran, dated March 2nd and received in paraphrased form by our Central Information Division, indicates an appalling lack, on our

SECRET

Colonel William J. Donovan - 2

March 6, 1942

part, of appreciation of Oriental psychology and Afghan sensibilities -- a deficiency that may have serious consequences. The paraphrase of this cable reads as follows:

"In a note dated February 28, the Afghan Ambassador informs me that his government does not agree to the sending of a Third Secretary and Vice Consul to Kabul before the appointment of an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary and that it is also preferable that the Legation be opened by the same Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary."

To the Afghans, very sensitive in matters of "face", it must have come as almost an insult to be told -- in effect -- that we would send a junior official to open a legation and that he would be followed at some indefinite later date by a Minister Plenipotentiary. We can be sure that the Axis diplomats at Kabul have made the most of our somewhat disdainful treatment of the Afghan nation.

It may already be too late to repair the damage; but unless we wish to lose all our remaining influence in Afghanistan, at a time when the good will of a country of such great strategic importance is a vital necessity to us, our Government should cease quibbling and meet the Afghan desires in this matter immediately.

G. T. Robinson
G. T. Robinson

J. A. Morrison
J. A. Morrison

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

File
SECRET

FROM: David Bruce
TO: Colonel Donovan
SUBJECT: Afghanistan

DATE: March 10, 1942

It would seem to be questionable policy for COI to suggest a course of action to the State Department in a realm that is peculiarly the business of that Department. If a United States Minister is not appointed to Afghanistan, there must be a good reason for this omission.

What COI can do, and is in the process of doing, is to facilitate the appointment of American teachers to the college in Kabul. By this means our information service will be able to keep as close a check as necessary on developments in Afghanistan.

David Bruce.

David Bruce.

SECRET

DATE _____

Mr. Bruce

DU
*Halb has not heard
of our suggestions for
school teachers.*

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

OFF HANSTAM 4641
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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

March 4, 1942

Colonel William J. Donovan
 Washington, D. C.

My dear Colonel Donovan:


Between Russia, Persia, and India lies the mountainous country of Afghanistan in a position which may become critical. Afghanistan has its reasons to hold aloof from Russia and from Great Britain. At the minimum it has no reason to be suspicious of the United States; at the maximum it has had reasons for being well disposed toward us. What may happen to India or to the Caucasus and Persia will affect Afghanistan very vitally. The United States has an opportunity to exert good offices at a needed point.

We have been represented in Afghanistan by remote control. Just as our Minister to Egypt was also accredited to Saudi Arabia, so our Minister to Iran (Persia) is also accredited to Afghanistan. Pressure of duties in Teheran makes such representation rather intermittent, to say the least.

It has been proposed that our representation at the Afghan capital, Kabul, be enlarged. But this must be done with the enlarged courtesy and significance demanded by the situation. I have just seen a wire from Teheran stating that Afghanistan cannot agree that a Third Secretary and a Vice Consul should be despatched to Kabul before the appointment of an Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, who should be the representative of the United States to open the new legation.

This is something more than fuss and feathers. We have an opportunity in Afghanistan beyond that of other nations. An affront to the dignity of a small nation that realizes its strategic importance would be a blunder. I hope that it will be possible to revise our plans of representation and start more cordial relations with Afghanistan on an initially cordial footing.

Sincerely yours,


 John A. Wilson

JAW:jr

CC: Dr. Langer
 Mr. John Morrison

APR 1964
OPERATION PLAN

VII I assume that time will have caught up with these
proposals of Colonel Eddy's and that I will be informed of the
results on arrival. Query: Why does an Assistant G-2 AFHQ exercise
any control of the 2677th unit operating under G-3 AFHQ?

E. G.

put in folder -
afuca h. operations

HEADQUARTERS 1877th HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
EXPERIMENTAL

APC 512 U.S. ARMY

11th September. 1943.

SUBJECT: History of the O.S.S. Intelligence Service in North Africa.

TO: Brig. General W. J. Donovan.

1. In this report I shall not deal with special operations, nor Psychological Warfare, nor with our four training schools, but only with our Intelligence Service.

2. As you know, O.S.S. cooperated with Mr. Robert D. Murphy in establishing comprehensive intelligence services in North Africa, our participation dating from January 6, 1942, when your first official representatives arrived in Tangier. Very largely through the services of the American Vice Consuls in North Africa, who had established valuable contacts with pro-allied Frenchmen, and later through special O.S.S. agents such as Carlton Coon, Gordon Browne, Joseph Raichle, and others, a network of intelligence was established which furnished valuable information to the U.S. Army and Navy, not only regarding groups prepared to resist the Axis, but also important technical studies of beaches, port facilities, coast defenses, and battle orders. During the months from February 1942 to October 1942, this intelligence service frequently signalled the departure of ships and planes bearing cargoes or personnel for the axis, which were promptly reported to Gibraltar for offensive action by the British Navy and the R.A.F. I think it is not very well known how thorough and effective was this intelligence service, which included personnel in very confidential posts in the French S.R., Zone Bureau, and other French services, who gave us the most secret documents, and to protect whom no report has ever been made.

3. After the Allied landing, November 8, 1942, General Clark ordered me to visit advanced Headquarters from Gibraltar, and gave me written orders attaching me to Mr. Murphy, Civil Affairs Department, to supervise the American and British secret intelligence under the direction and supervision of Mr. Murphy. Shortly after this, however, General Clark departed for Fifth Army headquarters at Djida, and I was transferred from Mr. Murphy to A.F.H.Q. Brigadier Mockley-Ferryman, Assistant Chief of Staff G-2, AFHQ, called me in and told me that OSS should cease to function as an intelligence service in North Africa, and that we should confine our activities to establishing advance

intelligence in Southern Europe and the islands of the Mediterranean. He said that North Africa was now a territory completely under the control of the Army which, having arrived to police the territory, had no need of secret intelligence services. Lt. Col. Hill-Dillon also told me that the problem of counter-espionage in North Africa was his exclusive province, and that he did not want OSS to maintain any services of this character within North Africa. I accepted these orders as quite logical and authoritative, and turned all my efforts to establishing advance posts and intelligence in territories across the Mediterranean to the North. Following this line, we established intelligence posts and radio stations in Southern Spain, Southern France, Corsica, and Sardinia, maintaining at the same time an active control of all Axis and Spanish hostile movements, political and military, in Tangier and Spanish Morocco.

4. It did not take me long to discover that in spite of the limitations placed upon OSS, the British were actively developing SIS and CE services in North Africa. Without raising any issue, I therefore began to reform our similar services in North Africa with centres in Casablanca, Oran, Algiers, and Tunis, using for this purpose our well tried and experienced representatives who had worked here for the previous two years. I must admit however, that these services had been reduced to one-quarter or less of their former personnel - (a) because most of our patriotic French contacts and agencies naturally transferred to the newly established French Intelligence Services attached to General Giraud; and (b) because other representatives of ours were turned over full time to civil affairs and other American services.

5. During the winter, we established, and now maintain regular intelligence services, including radio communications, with Tangier, Melilla, Malaga, Madrid, three radio stations in Southern France, one in Corsica (which was the principal direct source of intelligence for six months, until discovered by the enemy), Bernex (Switzerland), and Sardinia. Two intelligence teams destined for Sicily were prevented at the last minute from going to that island by orders of the Fifteenth Army Group, for fear of alerting the island. I regret to state until recently we have had no direct communication with the Italian mainland. We had no reliable agents in North Africa to send there, although we recruited many, only to reject them as insecure. Too late to be of much use for strategic intelligence, we now have 24 agents in Italy, as well as substantial groups working with the Seventh and Fifth Armies.

6. With the approval by the Theatre Command of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive No. 170, and with the arrival of personnel from OSS, Washington, we have redoubled our intelligence services in

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all these territories, both in North Africa and the countries to the north. Under this authority, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were developing a permanent intelligence service in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, and have been giving to G-2, AFHQ, considerable intelligence from France, Southern Spain and Corsica. Colonel Howard, G-2, Fifth Army, has stated emphatically that OSS has been his chief source of intelligence regarding Spanish Morocco and Southern Spain. Our principal agent in Southern France, Frederic Brown, whose achievements have been recognized as brilliant and rewarded by the offer of a commission as Captain in the American Army, has established chains of intelligence recognized for their value by G-2. More recently, we have concentrated upon operational intelligence with and in advance of our armies in the field, over forty of our Italian agents being now with Fifth Army at their request, and another forty or fifty working into the mainland from Sicily.

7. I regret to state that during the past three months our OSS intelligence services have been the object of repeated attack by the British SIS and by Lt.Col. Hill-Dillon, who has been heard to say that he is determined to scuttle the American intelligence services including OSS, CIC and A-2. Unfortunately I cannot make this charge official, first because this is no time to impede major operations with domestic quarrels, and secondly because the American Colonel who overheard this remark told me in confidence and cannot be quoted. Nevertheless, as you well know, our intelligence work has recently been repeatedly blocked. I cite the following illustrations:

(a) By control of transport by the Air Ministry or Admiralty, SIS finds it inconvenient to pick up our agents or to drop materials and supplies to them, alleging sometimes that the spot is unsafe, and other times that our agent, in their opinion, is unreliable. We have never undertaken to censor their agents, and must insist that we be the judges of the reliability of our agents.

(b) Recently an operation approved by AFHQ under our charter, was stopped by representations by SIS to the effect that the Foreign Office disapproved of the use of British craft and British seamen for this purpose. I objected strongly, and was supported by Brigadier Strong, to this unilateral interference by the Foreign Office in an operation which concerned only the Theatre Commander. It seems to me intolerable that allied craft may suddenly be claimed as British subject to orders from the Foreign Office, given not through the Theatre Commander, but through SIS, when all craft and personnel, British or American, are supposed to be allied

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craft and personnel. You can imagine what would happen if the State Department tried through OSS to interfere with a British SIS operation approved by the Theatre Commander.

- (c) Colonel Hill-Dillon has repeatedly sought to discredit us by stating that our reports were biased, were influenced by agents subject to American political policy in North Africa, and by complaining that we were doing counter espionage work without authority. It is difficult for me to understand why he includes the official British counter-espionage organization (XIB) and permits them to operate, while denying that right to OSS. Recently after having been promised that an XIB group with Fifth Army would include four British and four Americans, we discovered that the group was to consist of seven British and one American captain - Capt. Durand; and even Capt. Durand was not permitted to represent OSS directly, but was sent from London to report to Colonel Hill-Dillon, not to me, and is included, in my opinion, only to give the appearance of American participation in this activity. I might add that Capt. Durand is the first OSS representative in this theatre who has not been permitted to report to me as your chief representative.

8. I make no defense of our mistakes and of our failures. Occasionally we have passed on a report which did not bear examination. One such report from Sicily, representing only boastful opinion of Italian officer prisoners to the effect that they knew all about our invasion plans, has been misinterpreted to represent OSS opinion, which it definitely was not. This report is being made the basis of an attack upon us which, having been blocked in G-2 to whom I have explained the matter, is now being made the subject of complaint about us by the State Department. I would respectfully recommend that our activities be impartially examined by AFHQ, as I believe they are to be examined by Colonel Gridley, and that in this theatre where the Commander-in-Chief is an American General, we be given equal rights and privileges with SIS for the development of an American intelligence service, independent of authority except the Theatre Commander. I do not believe it is consistent with our national prestige, to have our intelligence service subject to veto by SIS London, or the Foreign Office, when we are operating under a charter approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by Theatre Commander.

Respectfully submitted,

W. A. RODY
Colonel, U.S.M.C.

INFORMATION

ROUTING SLIP

SECRET

Originator W. J. Schaffner
 Date 2/26/68
 Addressee _____
 Date Rec'd _____

Subject Dakar Cover Plan in Operation
"TORCH"

To	Room No.	Date		Initials	Comments
		Rec'd	Fwd'd		Indicate action desired or taken
Gen. Magruder		2/24	2/25	J.M.	Africa North Operation? x Baker x Jarch x Carter, Duggan
R.H.B.		26 FEB	26 FEB	J.M.	
Mr. Sullivan		2/25	26 FEB	W.C.	
E.H.B.				W.C.	
DAVIS		2-28		W.C.	
WILLIAMS			2/28	W.C.	
W.C. Sullivan				W.C.	
W.C.				W.C.	
W.C. Sullivan				W.C.	

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CO: Col. Tracer

5 February 1944

FROM: Donald Q. Gester, Lt. Col., AG

TO: Brig. General William J. Donovan

SUBJECT: Dakar Cover Plan in Operation "TIGER"

(1) As requested by you during our meeting yesterday, the following are the facts concerning the initiation and accomplishment of the Dakar Cover Plan in the North African invasion operations, insofar as my own activities in Casablanca prior to D Day were concerned.

(2) Before leaving for my post at Casablanca in January 1942, with the State Department cover of vice consul, you informed me that I was to use every means at my disposal to lead the Germans and Vichy French to believe that the American invasion of Africa would be focused at Dakar.

(3) Following my arrival in Casablanca, I made contact with two men who were to prove the key figures in the carrying out of this plan.

(4) These men, who were known to me as Lederer and Valikis, were both Austrians and inseparable friends. They were fanatically anti-Nazi and had joined the Foreign Legion in 1939. After the fall of France they were interned along with many other Legionnaires in the camp at Sidi-el-Aychi in French Morocco. They finally escaped and made their way to Casablanca where they made contact with German Consul General Auer, the head of the German Armistice Commission. (They had previously known Auer in Paris where he was attached to the German Embassy.) At this point I must add that Auer is a well-known pervert and that one of these men also had homosexual tendencies.

(5) Auer agreed to make the necessary arrangements with the French authorities for their freedom, on the condition that they act as agents for

United States

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the Audition Commission. They soon after formed a working agreement with the local French Bourgeois Bureau along very much the same lines -- i.e., to supply the French with information picked up from their German contacts. All these Franco-German dealings were on a strictly financial basis.

(6) Through communication with a mutual friend in London, I ascertained to my full satisfaction that these two Austrians had always been violently anti-Nazi and that their present contacts were formed purely for the expediency of the moment.

(7) Further proof of their loyalty was afforded me when, after several preliminary meetings, they informed me that they would be willing to work for me without receiving any payment for services rendered.

(8) Our first steps were to pass on to the Germans several scraps of information which, while technically correct, were of little military value. These consisted mainly of facts of only local interest which the members of the Commission could have easily ascertained for themselves with a minimum of effort. For example: (1) Who in our group lived in such and such a house, and what time did they leave in the A.M. and enter in the P.M. (2) The license numbers of the cars belonging to the various vice consuls. (3) On what days did the diplomatic pouch leave for Tangier or Algiers.

(9) Finally, when it appeared to Amer and the other members of the Commission that Lederer and Valukis were able to pry any information that they desired from me, I decided that the time was ripe to play up the Dakar angle.

(10) On numerous occasions Amer had asked "his" men to endeavor to pump me for any cracks that I might drop as to the time and place of any proposed Allied action aimed at French North or West Africa.

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(11) In the latter part of June, prior to my departure for London and Washington, I instructed my two agents to "shoot the works" on the Cover Plan. In other words, to inform the Germans that they had learned on first-hand information from me that the main Allied thrust was to be directed at Dakar. I told them to inform "our friends" that they had no idea of the date, but that the place was certain.

(12) Lederer and Valikis carried out my instructions to the letter, and the information was disseminated both to the German High Command and to Vichy.

(13) Proof that our phase of the Cover Plan was successful beyond all expectations, is the fact that on November 8th, nearly every German submarine in the South Atlantic and the Western Mediterranean had been diverted to the coast of French West Africa.

(14) Further visual proof was afforded me personally when, on November 9th at Tafaraoui airfield near Orlan, Major General Doolittle placed in my custody the 500 French Naval Air Force prisoners whom we had captured the previous day.

(15) The only remark which the French Commandant chose to make when I presented myself to him was: "Nous vous attendions à Dakar."

RONALD Q. COSTER
Lt. Colonel, AG

United States of America

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Equal Rights: MOST SECRET & SECRET

To: GENERAL DONOVAN

Do you know the source of
this document?

M.O'D

*Yes. I will
a letter for
may I know & me.
D.*

Director's Office

(3308)

Memorandum

1. - The division needs a rest. It has lived in the field about the better part of a year and it has been in combat or intensive training the first of the year. Rifle companies of the division average 1000 losses in that period. But the casualties do not indicate the extent of the tasks set and accomplished by the division. Staff officers Denholm, Crawford, Harris and Gordon say that rest is essential, that the troops should have at least two or three months in rear areas with good rations. ~~Revised~~ Although the troops fight expertly now, they lack the stamina they had in January. ~~and~~ they tire more quickly, well, the field officers say. They attribute this to physical weariness.

2. - Careful attention should be paid to the reception of troops back in the rear areas after hard fighting. Facilities should be provided for rest, recreation and ~~fresh~~ change of rations. Above all, area troops ~~should be~~ and others should be mentally conditioned to welcome them give up their privileges in Red Cross clubs, movies, etc., for a while the tired men from the front have a chance at them if facilities are available. Psychological aspect of this is most important. Strongest motivation of combat troops ~~is~~ is his ~~own~~ honor and his pride in a combat soldier. A little fuss over him does him a world of good. He gets back to a rear area and finds himself an object of attention. ~~and~~ to the particular attention of MP's, whom he sees the best of well, with the local girls tied up and wearing the same campaign ~~as~~ he has earned the hard way in the field, he is inclined to feel hurt. The reception of the exhausted 1st div at Oren was very bad in May and at

a responsible and open dangerous aspect on the division which was
 terribly. Officers and men alike were affected. It was particularly
 General Allen's extraordinary knowledge of how to handle troops and the personal loyalty he commanded of his
 men that pulled the division together in time for what at that time
 to be another very difficult mission. I confess that as late as the
 week of June, I seriously wondered whether he could do it after
 daily among the various units and talking to men and officers I
 think it would be most advisable to give combat troops some kind of
 combat service stripe, medal, or something which would set them apart
 from base area troops.

3. - After long periods of combat, worthy officers should be
 train fresh troops. This would greatly benefit the new troops and
 provide refreshing change and rest for the officers.

4. - The slowness of promotion and awarding of decorations and
 submission of citations has been insupportable and in many instances
 disgraceful. I know of many instances of officers who were recommended
 duty with the 1st div for lack of physical or moral stamina who
 promoted at once or twice in safe rear jobs while their fellow
 were good enough to continue in the field have not yet been
 field promotions have taken as much as two months to come through.
 citations for DSC submitted by the division since Jan 1, 1954 were
 all of the Division campaign, one had been granted (and this was
 award up to the time we sailed for Sicily. These things have a
 demoralizing effect.

5. - DSC's should be given more responsibility and more prestige. They
 currently treated like privates now. In battle they don't have the
 of men's dignity or morale and they don't have the grip on the

... consequently the loss on June 1st of 1968 is very heavy. The reason for the very high percentage of officer casualties of the 1st is recommended that in next areas NGC should be quartered separately from the 1st and that chain of command should be rigorously observed in the future.

6. - G-2 should police troops much more assiduously to counteract rumors and propaganda. The rumor started among all troops in May upon conclusion of the "unisian" campaign they would be sent home. Steps to counteract this were not sufficiently vigorous and the consequent disillusionment ~~was~~ adversely affected the men.

7. - There is a great need for better close support of aviation. Front line troops do not fire at low flying, strafing planes. They and do not disclose their positions by firing. If they do fire with rifles and not with effective anti-aircraft which they do not have, it helps offensive troops greatly in pinning down the enemy during the attack.

8. - Closer support of tanks ~~is~~ for infantry is needed. The tanks move mainly at night. Tanks should move up at the same time to be in positions ~~not~~ far enough forward by daylight to assist in pushing forward or to repel the customary counterattack. ~~Remember~~ ~~Remember~~ ~~Remember~~ with us on this, but the practice almost invariably has been to let tanks come from far back in daylight, with the result that they arrive too late to be of the most effective help, or come up exposed to enemy guns and cannot get in action.

9. - We should make more use of tactical nuisance night bombing. It could be a plan, with use of flares, personnel bombs and other nerve agents.

The United States has done a magnificent job. It has been
finished. It has executed every mission with determination, skill
and frequently under very discouraging conditions. It has
been cheerful and its sense of obligation to its country and
its traditions does it honor. Its only slump was the one that
came after the conclusion of the Russian campaign, and I am not
sure that this would not have happened had there been
little more foresight on the part of higher command and more
common-sense psychology.

*File
Africa Op. Plan*

No. 250

February 13, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

By arrangement with the State and War Departments, we are sending Colonel Robert Solborg, who is head of our Special Operations group, to Lisbon. From there he will direct operations in North Africa and at the same time make whatever arrangements are necessary in Portugal.

No. 201

January 31, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

Attached is a brief estimate of the
French military leaders in French North
Africa. It was prepared by Chautemps.

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As far as the military leaders in French North Africa are concerned, we do not believe that great hopes should be based on them.

General Juin, who commands in Morocco, was a prisoner of the Germans and was freed after promising never again to take up arms against Germany or undertake anything against her which other French officers refused to do.

He was sent to Morocco after Weygand was recalled, and it appears probable that his nomination, made by Darlan, was agreeable to the Germans.

We think that General Koeltz (or Coels) who is at the head of the Algerian troops, is the same General who was sent by Weygand to Algeria in June, 1940, to determine the technical possibilities for the resistance proposed by General Nogues. He brought back an entirely unfavorable opinion to the Ministers' Council which was used to impose the Armistice.

We had the impression that this mission was not so much to really study the military situation but rather to find arguments to overcome the opposition to capitulation.

We do not wish to draw any conclusion from these memories as to General Koeltz' own feelings. However, we were not surprised when we were assured that this officer in Algeria, was considered to be in favor of collaboration with Germany.

General de Lattre de Tassigny, commander of the troops in

- 2 -

Tunisia, at the beginning of the war was Chief of Staff to General Bourret, commander of the Fifth Army on the Rhine front. General Bourret, former Chief of the Military Cabinet and a personal friend of Daladier, was a republican officer who came up from the ranks. To what extent did his Chief of Staff share his ideas? We could not say.

However, General de Lattre de Lassigny, at that time had a favorable reputation. It seems to us, according to personal information together with these memories, that General de Lattre de Lassigny perhaps deserves more attention than his two colleagues in Algeria and Morocco from the American authorities.

The successor to General Odic, who joined the de Gaulle movement after having commanded the aviation of all North Africa for a year, is a General who on his arrival in Algeria did not hesitate to criticize General Weygand's attitude, not sufficiently orthodox in his eyes. He has been described to us as an ardent supporter of the regime and of the policy of the extremists.

As for General Harcourt, whose name has been mentioned in connection with North Africa, he has been retired and has left Algeria to direct civil aviation at Vichy.

There remains a military personage in Algiers whose role is vague but doubtless of some importance; Admiral Penard who

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was brought by General Weygand as his secretary general and who has remained at his post even after the General's departure. He is an adherent of the regime and more of a bureaucrat than a politician.

It seems to us that the civil administration leaders, although two out of the three are of military origin, are much less ardent, more cool-headed, and are in closer contact with the inhabitants and with the realities of daily life.

Admiral Esteva, Resident General at Tunis, is considered in the navy as an outspoken man who has no sympathy for the German or the Italians. He is certainly loyal to Marshal Petain, but it is believed in general that he does adhere to the policy of submission.

The Governor General of Algeria, Yves Chatel, is a distinguished official who was completely successful in Indo-China. He came to Algeria as General Weygand's civilian collaborator and fully satisfied the population by his administrative qualities.

When General Weygand was made Governor General of Algeria, relieving Admiral Abrial, Yves Chatel was his assistant and already assured the management of the civilian administration. After Weygand was recalled, Chatel's actual position was only confirmed when he was officially assigned the post of Governor General.

In his case, one seems to be dealing with a man who symbolizes the good French official of which France must have many today;

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they are people who are more concerned with their country and their duties than with one political regime or another, and who have continued to serve France after the Armistice in the same spirit of devotion as before. Quite certainly they think about recent events and do so intelligently most of the time. They approve neither of the excessive internal measures of the militant supporters of the regime, nor of the treasonable actions of the collaborationists. In the present public misfortune, they cling to the prestige and integrity of Marshall Petain in whom they have confidence. One must not hope that they will rebel against their chiefs, but one can be certain that they will make every effort to maintain, as far as they are able, the independence of their country and preserve American friendship for France. Therefore, there certainly is a policy which should be used in regard to such men.

General Nogues to whom a part of these preceding general observations could be applied, is nevertheless a slightly more complicated case.

Nogues is a very distinguished soldier. For a long time he has also been an extremely diplomatic high official. Through his family connections and social habits he is also something of a politician. His wife, who has great influence over him and has a great many outside activities, is the

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daughter of the former Foreign Minister, Delcassé, who played an important role in European politics at the beginning of the century. One should not lose sight of the fact - and we hope that M. and Mme. Nogues will do the same - that the most important action of Delcassé's career was the cordial Franco-British entente. Nogues has administered Morocco with a certain amount of success since 1936, besides which he has been Commander-in-Chief of French North African forces since 1939. In this position he had worked to increase the strength of the African Army. In spite of the scarcity of modern material, owing to insufficient industrial means, he had established a solid instrument of war which it would have been possible to plan to reinforce in case of a setback on the principal fronts. Unfortunately the contrary took place; beginning on May 10 the Commandment emptied North Africa of her best soldiers and modern material.

Nevertheless, General Nogues in strong terms proposed to the Government that they seek refuge in Algeria where he was preparing to defend himself. It was at that time that General Weygand sent General Koeltz, as we have already told, to establish the technical impossibility of the proposed resistance.

General Nogues bowed to the armistice decision but not

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without having very nobly protested. He was even threatened with disgrace because of the vigour of his telegram to General Weygand and it was with great difficulty that President Lebrun and M. Camille Chautemps were able to defend him.

Sometime later we had the opportunity to question him about those events. Was it simply a change of technical conviction or professional discipline. He did not hesitate to tell us that he had been misinformed at the time of his appeal for resistance, that at that time he did not believe the defeat at home to have been such a catastrophe and, therefore, that there would be time to transport fresh troops and material to Africa. He added that since the facts were better known, he believed the decision not to attempt a hopeless struggle in Africa was wise. According to him, a German attack, preceded by a landing, even by air, in Spanish Morocco would have found French Africa so little prepared for modern war that the destruction and conquest of our beautiful colony would have been certain and rapid.

We recently ascertained that this was likewise the opinion of another officer of great merit and in his case cannot be accused of any partiality towards Vichy, since he has gone to join General de Gaulle. We are speaking of General Odic who was in command of aviation in North Africa.

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This is a point which we would especially like to bring to the attention of the American Government. The question of responsibilities in regard to the Armistice which, according to some can have no other explanation but treason, is poisoning the atmosphere. Even recently M. Churchill, in his Ottawa speech, declared that if the French had gone to Africa, Italy would have been liquidated in 1940. It is on this assertion that he principally bases his indiscriminate accusation of "the men of Bordeaux". This is a technical point which we ask the American Government to study. According to us, this conclusion, derived from the facts, has not been proved and springs from irritation rather than reflection. Doubtless one could have conceived a plan - and the High Command and the Prime Minister are guilty of not having studied the possibilities - for a prepared general retreat towards Algeria in case of a metropolitan defeat. But the men and available material should have been sent in time. We do know that this was not the case, for Reynaud on the eve of his resignation was still considering with de Gaulle what they called the "reduit Breton" (retreat in Brittany) without even having referred to the Commander-in-Chief. Therefore, there could not have been any important quantity of arms in North Africa. The English, after Dunkirk, did not have at their disposal any material which could have been sent to the French

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and America had just answered that she could do nothing.

Under these conditions the British Prime Minister's assurance is not based on serious proofs. One could just as well maintain that the Armistice, without collaboration, would not have placed the Allies in a worse situation than would have resulted from the total occupation of France with two million more prisoners, the naval bases like Toulon, and doubtless all the French African bases, in the hands of the enemy.

To return to General Nogues; in the past he had a good attitude, later he submitted to the new regime. In August, 1940, he seemed to us somewhat timorous with regard to government authority. Nevertheless, we believe that his inner feelings must have remained the same, and we cannot consider him either as an enemy of England or America or as a friend of Germany.

In our opinion, one should seek the support of the more modest but more independent agents rather than rely on the great leaders. In North Africa there are legions of officials of medium rank who have influence on both the French and native populations and who ask nothing better than to work for the liberation of their country.

It is necessary to create, with the support of those

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who can be approached - and by going from one to the other, one will find a great number - an atmosphere of sympathy towards the Americans, suppressed hostility towards the Germans, and Italians and towards those who wish to submit to them and develop a hopeful and expectant spirit in the population. The leaders will feel it and will themselves be more confident, or more prudent.

When the day comes and the need is felt, one will find a population prepared to do their duty towards their country and towards their liberators.

No. 487

May 11, 1942

12 noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following comes from our man charged with coordinating our subversive efforts in French North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula:

"I have seen the following men during my visit here: Sir Alexander Cadogan, Sir Stafford Cripps, Desmond Morton, Admiral Godfrey, General Ismay, General Davidson, Brigadiers Strong, Kirkman, Stuart, Lord Selborne, and the leading S. O. and S. I. personalities. This week I will see Mountbatten. They all agree that Northwest African territory should be safeguarded for the United Nations and that military intervention on our part must immediately follow subversive activities, otherwise these activities are fruitless.

"A directive to S.O.E. here is being prepared by the Chiefs of Staff. It will embrace subversive activities, propaganda and negotiations to be entered into with responsible North African military leaders from whom assurances that our forces would be received without resistance can be obtained. The Chiefs of Staff understand that military operation in Northwest Africa must be American and the directive will be referred to Washington for approval when ready.

"In order that the position of our forces and French military leaders can be discussed at the highest plane, I consider it necessary to have a meeting in Lisbon between our and theirs who must be ready to meet at an approximate time of our intended

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belief that such a meeting could be arranged and your views and instructions would be required.

"Subversive activities which aim at the destruction of military objectives must be entrusted to professional hands rather than to vague sympathizers and unconfirmed patriots whose action is governed by fear and opportunity. I do not believe in effective French resistance to Axis incursion in Africa even if they should be armed and equipped by us.

"The matters which I reported the end of April in my secret letter have been explored further. The friend mentioned therein has obtained discretionary powers from the British Government to keep me fully informed and to continue operations. Another channel is thus provided to reach leaders in North Africa.

"An agreement with S. I. and S. O. here has been reached for joint planning of action in North Africa. The stores for action will be available to us at Gibraltar. In due course you will receive our joint plan."

As I advised you in my memoranda of April 22 and April 27, 1942, I am conforming to the indication given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The reference in the last paragraph of the above report as to stores available at Gibraltar refers to my request that instead of buying stores here and going through the dangers of shipment, we obtain them from the British there and make up to them at this end.

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The secret letter referred to in the next to the last paragraph of the above report was sent to you on May 9th.

From the same representative I have received the following comments on other theatres:

"I gather from my various talks here that the degree of success or failure of the German campaign in the east will govern British offensive action this summer. Meanwhile various small scale operations together with RAF intensive sweeps are planned.

"Although the British evaluation of immediate German moves is diffused, the majority believe that the weight of the German attack will fall on Southern Russia, possibly with simultaneous action on Moscow.

"My personal comment is that unless Germany is assured of simultaneous Japanese attack on Russia from the west, she will not launch a large scale offensive against Russia. I believe that it would be wise to watch Japanese movements in Siberia. I rather think that we may contemplate intensive action by the Germans in the western desert and possible occupation of French Africa in order to secure Dakar as a counterweight to Madagascar.

"My view that Russia is unable to penetrate German defensive lines in the east is shared by some British intelligence officers."

No. 440

April 22, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

I have previously sent you word of our operation in North Africa. Yesterday we received the following word from the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

"At their meeting on April 14th, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed dispatches received by the Coordinator of Information from Lieutenant Colonel Eddy, Assistant Naval Attache at Tangier, recommending the shipment of military materiel to French Morocco.

"After careful consideration of these dispatches and other pertinent information on the subject, the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed unfavorably the proposal to furnish war materials to French Morocco at this time. They are, however, in accord with the policy of expending funds judiciously for the purpose

of initiating and maintaining guerilla opposition in that area."

In view of this we will have to proceed by the spending of money which I have already advised you we have been doing. I think it most important that we maintain our activity there.

No. 429

April 20, 1942
6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

I think you should be advised of the attached information at once which we have received from our man in Tangier.

I have previously informed you of Lt. Colonel Eddy's activities in North Africa. Eddy is a Marine officer, a former Brigade Intelligence officer, and more recently President of Hobart College. His reports have indicated that the situation in French Morocco is becoming hourly more critical. He believes, as do others with whom he is in touch, that we have many friends among certain groups there, and those friends have asked for support in the form of money and war material.

Murphy of the State Department is working closely with Eddy. This whole matter has been placed before the Joint Chiefs of Staff with a full exposition of the situation.

No. 437

April 21, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

You might be interested in looking at the attached memorandum which is an account of the relations of General Robert Odic with the Free French and deGaulle.

General Robert Odie, formerly head of the French Air Forces in North Africa under Weygand, was interviewed by Mr. John Wiley in his office on Tuesday, April 7. The General had come to the United States in November, 1941, on the invitation of United States officials. When the resignation of General Weygand was announced, Odie issued a statement declaring his allegiance to the Free French forces. Shortly thereafter he left for England, to talk with deGaulle and to observe the situation in his movement. His return here was delayed by difficulties of transportation, and he arrived back in the United States on April 4. The following is the substance of the report which he gave to Mr. Wiley, setting forth his reactions to the London scene. It supplements the information contained in the memorandum of April 9 to Colonel Donovan and was prepared before the General had any knowledge of the change in the government at Vichy.

1. General Odie's attitude toward Vichy

When he made his declaration of allegiance to the forces of the Free French on November 29, 1941, it was not the act of one who repented of having followed the politics of Vichy. Rather, it affirmed the continuance of a practical course of resistance to Germany which until then had been carried out in an area where France, militarily vanquished, had nevertheless been able to invoke the clauses of the armistice to defend such independence as was left to her, and in particular to maintain the fleet and so much of the Empire as was outside the grasp of Germany.

General Odie had been in a position to observe the evolution of Nazi pressure on Vichy, and the effect of Nazi propaganda on certain members of the government. The resignation of

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General Weygand, under whose orders he had been serving for a year, and the announcement of the next interview between Marshal Petain and Chancellor Hitler seemed to him characteristic events which left no doubt that the party favoring an alliance with Germany had gained the ascendancy. The irremediable he feared, was about to be committed. In these circumstances it seemed indispensable that French public opinion should compel, or at least facilitate, the Government's retreat from its posture of abdication.

The General was convinced that this manifestation was not in vain, since the Hitler-Petain interview was postponed and then abandoned. The delays thus won, moreover, made possible the evolution of opinion following the Russian shift from the defensive to the offensive and the entrance of the United States into the War.

The Vichy government, as a result, seemed to have returned to a firmer attitude toward German demands. The problem today, as it has been all along, remains essentially that of extending this attitude, until the time when France, without committing suicide, can resume an active role in support of her former allies.

The General thus found himself, he asserted, in complete agreement with the policy of the United States toward France.

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He believed that the value of that policy had been justified by its results.

2. The General's attitude toward the Free French

In going to London, General Odie had been convinced that his opinions coincided with those of General de Gaulle. He supposed that de Gaulle's movement professed to be nothing else than a provisional representation of France, necessarily disavowed by the Government, but faithful to the country. France, it seemed to him, had need of such a representation - a spiritual center for its hopes of deliverance, a symbol under which the basic unity of all the French people would be fostered. France needed, moreover, an organization careful to dissipate the misconceptions which the German policy cleverly multiplies, firm in safeguarding the interests, profoundly real, which she holds in common with the United Nations.

In the General's opinion the value of such an organization was the greater as France represented more than intellectual forces, the ruin of which was to be regarded with pity. Although France, exposed without sufficient arms to the aggression of the dictators, was overcome, her youth has been regenerated. They have been recalled from a twenty years' pursuit of materialism. So it is in the occupied zone, where hate of the invader has aroused the spirit of resistance and revitalized the sentiment

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of duty and the virtue of sacrifice. So it is in the unoccupied zone, where the education of youth is carried forward in a frame of questionable principles but of undoubted effectiveness. It must be remembered that the France of tomorrow will reappear in conditions analogous to those in which, after 1918, Germany found in the depths of her misery a youth movement fanatically dedicated to action, regardless of its aim.

The long-range problem which faces the democracies is to avoid those errors which might place the youth of France in the enemy camp. The more immediate objective is to keep the fleet and empire outside of the German grasp. The democracies will be wise if they provide for their own support at the time when the balance sheet of military operations shows to their favor.

3. First doubts concerning de Gaulle.

The General emphasized his desire to present facts in the strict spirit of an observer, only relating those events of which he had been an eyewitness or of whose validity he had definite proof.

He did not consider it a departure from this attitude to avow the undeniable impression, gained on his arrival in London, that de Gaulle represents something quite different from the symbol of French resistance to German oppression. Again and again he was confronted by one basic question: "Is it against Germany that de Gaulle is waging war - or is it against Vichy?"

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Other questions inevitably followed:

Why had not the French people in London rallied behind General de Gaulle? Why, on the contrary, did they make so evident their estrangement from the movement, if not their frank hostility to it, that the General found it necessary to draw a sharp line between the Free French and the de Gaullists?

Why in the army itself did a number of French officers, particularly capable, prefer serving in inferior ranks with the British to serving with the de Gaullist forces?

Why did the review La France Libre take its stand in opposition to the movement of which it should be the spokesman?

One was driven to the inevitable conclusion, said General Odie, that de Gaullism is simply the expression of one man's ambition.

The General's primary intention was to hold himself aloof from all de Gaullist activity, though remaining on polite terms for the sake of French unity. He felt compelled, nevertheless, to state the danger which the de Gaullist movement presented to the general conduct of the war.

Apart from the civil conflict to be foreseen in France, the efforts made to exploit and aggravate the tension existing between Great Britain and Vichy would already have led to war between them had not the United States maintained its representation at Vichy. The danger of such a war persists.

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The General realized that in the circumstances he could not close his eyes to quarrels of far more than personal significance. Without joining any party, he therefore listened to the statements of all alike. He also held interviews with such qualified Englishmen as desired to know his opinion, not concealing from them the gravity of the situation nor the urgent necessity to remedy it. On the other hand, he refused such intervention as might have changed his position from that of witness to partisan. In particular he had not felt able to reply to solicitations for the proposal of a solution.

His own reputation, the General believed, might have saved him from charges of ambition or intrigue; but as the guest of the United States he thought it better to remain clear of even the taint of suspicion in regard to a question which touched the interests of the United States as well as of Great Britain.

Accordingly, in English circles he dwelt rather on the material and moral situation of France as they might influence present and future relations, rather than discoursing on the errors of Carlton Garden - a subject that was quite unpleasant to him.

4. First interview with de Gaulle.

The day of his arrival in London, December 12, 1941, Odia had a first interview with General de Gaulle. He was immediately offered the post of Commander-in-Chief of all military, naval, and air forces in Africa.

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General Odie pointed out to de Gaulle that he desired no post. To one who had been a high officer of the Legion of Honor and a General for more than five years with an army command during the war, a command of non-existent troops in a secondary theater of operations would risk diminishing his usefulness rather than affirming it. For himself he asked only to be taken into account by the Free French so far as conformed to the propositions that had been made to him in Washington. In that way he hoped to be an anonymous and helpful influence in the American war effort.

Such an action, General Odie maintained, corresponded to the friendship which America, by many signal acts, had held out to France since 1914. It was not, perhaps, the course best calculated to serve his own advantage, but it was enough if his country should be helped thereby to win sympathies of which it would one day have need.

What had concerned General Odie in coming to London was less his own fate than the question of France's resuming her place in the war, when circumstances would at last permit it. He was anxious, therefore, to give formal assurance to de Gaulle that under the preconsulship of General Weygand military and naval bases had been vigorously kept from German hands. That was more important, he maintained, than the

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military weight of forces insufficient in number and lacking modern arms. The problem, as he saw it, was to prepare these arms and to create a situation in which they could become effective, rather than to indulge in untimely actions, the outcome of which would be the very thing that all were anxious to avoid - namely, a German occupation.

General deGaulle's reply to this statement was that he did not want Odie to work for the American Government, and that the suggested method of defending North Africa did not correspond to the position which he had taken. General Weygand, like Marshal Petain, was a traitor who ought to be shot.

General Odie realized that there was no further use in explaining his stand. From that moment he was resolved to withdraw as quietly as possible. Odie satisfied himself, therefore, with the reply that he did not share deGaulle's opinion.

5. Second interview with deGaulle

Two days later General Odie met deGaulle again, having established relations, according to deGaulle's request, with the National Committee.

Being asked to give his opinion of the organization, Odie did not hesitate to affirm that the Committee was devoid of figures of any standing, and that it seemed to him in no way representative of France.

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General deGaulle was inclined to agree, remarking that it was not his fault if his leadership had not in all cases been followed.

The evidence (as General Odie remarked to Mr. Wiley) made it impossible to accept that reply without reservations. One was led to inquire whether the qualified authorities had not been systematically discarded in the fear of their becoming rivals and whether the formation of the committee had not been determined on the principle that its members should owe everything to the master and be altogether attached to his fortunes.

However that might be, Odie confirmed his refusal of a military command. General deGaulle then informed him that he would give him the head of an important military mission which he was organizing in Washington.

Withholding a definite answer until he could return to the United States, Odie made no objection to the offer.

6. Third Interview with deGaulle

After several informal meetings, during one of which the General issued the demand that no one was ever to say that France had had no alternative but to accept the armistice, Odie had his last interview with deGaulle on February 3.

The question of deGaulle's political orientation being raised, Odie expressed his astonishment that de Gaulle should

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not strive to narrow the breaches which were being opened from day to day among the French, and to unite them under the banner of national liberation. Odie made clear the sentiments of high authorities, civil and military, who were sworn enemies of collaboration, and whose present positions in France and North Africa were a bulwark against collaboration, eminently valuable, if not indispensable, to the war effort of the United Nations. He deemed it vital to preserve contact with these men, he said, so that they would be ready, when the time came, to take up the fight at the side of the Free French.

Odie thereupon received what he termed a stupefying answer: "Since you think in this way, you have only to return to Africa and I will make war upon you."

7. L'Affaire Muselier

When General Odie arrived in London he did not see Admiral Muselier who had already left on a cruiser for American waters. According to Odie's version of the affair, Muselier, during his voyage to America, received a telegram from deGaulle ordering him, under threat of penalty, to occupy St. Pierre and Miquelon.

Replying to objections raised by the Admiral, deGaulle affirmed that the occupation order was part of an agreement with England, an agreement which did not in fact exist. The English government, on the contrary, had received assurance that the

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enterprise would not be undertaken. That assurance had no value, according to deGaulle, because it was not written.

Enlightened on his return to London as to the origins of the affair, Admiral Muselier considered himself obligated to protest by offering his resignation from the National Committee. He intended, nevertheless, to maintain his command of the naval forces.

The reply of General deGaulle to this gesture of independence on the part of a member of the National Committee was the dismissal of Muselier from his naval command.

Challenged on the regularity of such a move, General deGaulle sentenced Muselier to thirty days imprisonment, seeking assurance from the British that the sentence would be executed. That assurance was not given. The officers of the naval force had in the meantime declared themselves loyal to the Admiral. At the time of General Odic's departure from London more than thirty resignations from the deGaulle movement had already been framed by the London officers.* The General had not been able to verify reports that the protest had spread to the sailors. He was unwilling, moreover, to say anything of events that had occurred since his

* British sources state that actually only four officers resigned from the Free French Naval force.

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departure on March 22.

In addition to commenting on the danger to discipline implicit in these manifestations, General Odie revealed his confirmed impression that the English Admiralty was far from being unfavorably inclined toward Muselier. He went so far as to suggest that their friendly attitude toward him implied the following considerations:

- a general criticism of the deGaulle movement and its procedures;

- approval of Admiral Muselier's demand that the French laws be applied to the deGaulle forces to check a regime of personal decrees;

- condemnation of General deGaulle for having bribed the chief code clerk in order to learn the contents of certain telegrams exchanged between Muselier and his chief of staff.

8. The Incident of the Libyan supplies

In England's critical situation, public opinion in London was particularly excited by the report that provisions of war were being sent by the French to Rommel.

General Odie, for his part, considered it likely that Vichy had suffered from a renewed lack of firmness; but he believed the incident was at most a gesture, demanded by Germany as a means of compromising the Vichy government and of foster-

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ing the dissensions from which it was hoped that total collaboration would emerge. It was evident, moreover, that the outcome of the operations in Lybia had in no way been determined by such supplies as were sent.

General Odie had been compelled to notice, nevertheless, the policy followed by Carlton Garden on the occasion. In the London press everything possible was done to aggravate British feeling. A report, doubtful in its nature, probably inspired by the Germans, was exploited by every means and used to intensify bitterness between Great Britain and the French people.

2. The Russian broadcast

"Le Broadcast Russe" is the name given by London circles to General deGaulle's radio address of December, delivered at the moment of the difficult situation created by the occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon.

All parties joined gladly in a tribute to the magnificent Russian resistance and to the will which, during the past twenty years, has made it possible. The uneasiness aroused in London, which certainly was echoed in France, was not caused by this tribute, but by the form of its presentation; silence on the English endurance which had made possible the Russian stand, and implicit condemnation of the democratic tradition of the Western world.

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For the light which it throws on General deGaulle's intentions, both in regard to the war and the peace, the "Broadcast Russe" deserves a study beyond the scope of the present discussion.

10. Conclusion

It had not been possible, General Odie concluded, to remain apart from these events. Yet the opinions which he had formed in London were derived from the position of an impartial observer which he had striven to maintain. Today, in the same spirit, he would withhold judgments. He would only add his conviction that the London officials understood the failure of the present French movement, both on the military and political levels. In a large measure they had been responsible for that movement. Now, unquestionably, they are seeking a solution.

The extent to which the American Government should concern itself in the problem, General Odie was not prepared to say.

Soon the German military and naval attaches and staff will arrive in Tangier. German Admiral Canaris is en route to Tangier on a secret mission. He will remain concealed in the consulate here and will be incognito. This week Herr Ried, the German Minister who will succeed Consul Moehring, is arriving. Other recent arrivals in Tangier are Roederer who arrived April 15th and was met at the airport with ceremony, and Max Franz Bach, fourth Gestapo paymaster, who arrived February 24th. Two Gestapo agents have arrived from Moroc for the specific purpose of watching Americans in Tangier. Tomorrow six German agents are arriving by plane. Axis plots to attack members of our Legation have been intercepted here by reliable sources.

No. 410

April 15, 1942

12 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

Here are two additional cables from our man in Tangier which were received yesterday. All of the Eddy cables were the subject of discussion at the Joint Intelligence Committee meeting yesterday and are under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"No. 28 - Re my number 24. We are also asked by our French partners how soon we would be able to furnish heavy material to Bathurst, Freetown or Liberia and kept there by Americans secret from knowledge of agents of the Axis and ready for French vessels to pick it up and transport to Morocco or Tunis at H. hour. List in following dispatch in which page references are to 'Science te La Nie', December 1941.

"No. 29 - One thousand motorcycles with postillion seat. Five hundred motorcycles with side cars and 2-wheel drive, fifty 105MM howitzers with trucks and tractors, one hundred fifty 105MM anti-aircraft page 325, three hundred

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87 MM anti-aircraft page 335, ammunition for all of these guns, four hundred fifty M-24 tanks page 338, three hundred M-30T-6 tanks and one hundred fifty scout cars page 337. One hundred fifty AUTOMITRAIL-LEUSES (probably jeeps)."

No. 416

April 15, 1942

12 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

Further on the subject of the recent cables from our man in Tangier, I send you herewith a cable which has just been received and which indicates that more follows. The remainder of the report will be forwarded to you as soon as the decoding has been completed. This entire matter was discussed with Secretary Knox by Colonel Burton of my office this morning.

"With reference to your number 21. Other departments naturally have no evidence corroborating Secret Intelligence of well organized French military organization determined to resist the Axis. Only Murphy can confirm and he is urgently requesting me to finance and supply on the modest scale requested in my recent dispatches. French leaders would be arrested on slightest suspicion and shot if exposed. They have no news in advance of Laval government

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and fear Vichy surrender of North Africa soon.
If Malta falls, Germans plan to enter Tunisia
with or without Spanish zone attack on Morocco.
More follows."

No. 399

April 13, 1942
12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

Following the cable from our man in Tangier which I sent you on Friday evening, yesterday we received two additional messages:

1. "I am giving Murphy assurance that you will arrange free dollar credit to Howard J. Sachs, 30 Pine Street, New York City. This will be for the benefit of Aliab, Deerfield, Connecticut and/or his family. This deal is with the second group separate from the blocked dollar deal with Robinhood. Seventeen thousand five hundred dollars will be the amount. This will be used to purchase immediately two million Algerian Francs in Algeria at the rate of one hundred fifteen francs per free dollar. Exact dollar cost will be sent later. This matter must not be

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delayed. Please confirm my authority.*

2. *There is a rapidly approaching crisis in military events and French ability to resist. Cannot wait for delayed answers regarding authority to finance resistance and exchange rates. Subject only to the approval of Murphy and Childs, I propose now to use the fifty thousand dollars now credited to me here. This I will use at my discretion to finance Arab and French resistance. I also request immediate credit for a half million dollars for me to use on similar terms as above in an emergency.*

I have already arranged to place the \$17,500 to Sachs' credit. In addition there is \$50,000 to Eddy's credit in Tangier.

I ask your approval to make available \$500,000 which he requests, and which I still have out of your fund on the North African project.

No. 392

April 10, 1942

"Special"

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

I thought you would want to see immediately a message which has just come to us from our man in Tangier. I have not discussed it with anyone, but have transmitted the contents to the Army and Navy.

"It is anticipated by the French Command that there will be a German break through Tunisia, and a possible attack simultaneously through Spanish Morocco. The French are now determined to resist and asked today

"How soon can you deliver at Port Lyautey:

20,000 anti tank mines, 15 kilos each
(packed in cases weighing 20 to 30 kilos)

8000 similar mines will be wanted elsewhere later."

The French have requested the utmost secrecy and speed. Please advise. Have advised Chief of Staff at Gibraltar."

No. 388

April 8, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

Through one of our men in North Africa, and from a source which he considers absolutely reliable, we have just received the following information:

The P.P.F. (Partie Doriot) in the capital is closely collaborating with the Occupation Authorities.

The head of unoccupied France is a certain QUEYRAT, former lawyer of Casablanca, expelled by order of General Weygand. QUEYRAT is also director of the newspaper "L'Emancipation Nationale".

In the occupied zone, FOSSATI has taken an important place together with a certain ARRIGHI.

Contact with the Germans at Vichy is assured by the Commissioner of the GESTAPO GEISSLER who had been on a mission to Oran.

The P.P.F. in collaboration with GEISSLER is preparing

- 2 -

in North Africa an actual overthrow of the Government by means of which French Africa would be handed over to the German Army.

Lists of suspected officials have been prepared. In Algeria all the high Government officials will be replaced by trustworthy men, such as Arrighi and Fossati.

Similar precautions have been taken in Morocco, and Queyrat is also supposed to have an important post.

The French Government and Marshal Petain would be kept in ignorance of this maneuver and be faced with the accomplished fact. The ringleaders count on the apathy of the higher officers and the army in general in order to succeed (thanks to some complicity) without meeting any serious resistance; if necessary more effective aid would be given by the Occupation Authorities.

Copies have been furnished to the Army and Navy Intelligence.

No. 381

April 7, 1942

8:30 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

As I indicated in my memorandum to you the other day, after conferences with the State Department we have worked out a special propaganda campaign to France. The main objectives of the plan are as follows:

(a) To endeavor to block formation of collaborationist government in France by mobilization of French opinion in favor of policy of resistance.

(b) If German maneuver cannot be blocked, creation of a situation in unoccupied zone which will force the resignation of Marshal Petain and Germans to move in.

(c) Should this occur, cause the French military forces in North Africa and the French fleet to join with us in the fight against Germany.

No. 333

March 17, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

We are making an effort in Tunis to help the British in Libya. The following is the background of the plan.

The political set up in Tunisia is under a Bey. This Bey has a position analogous to that of the Sultan of Morocco, with the French Resident General as his Counselor and Minister of Foreign Affairs. This French Resident General prepares the laws and decrees and presents them to the Bey for his signature in order to make them operative in Tunisian territory. The Bey is 84 years of age. His successor to-be is over 70.

The Beylical family are all completely venal. The Bey's Prime Minister, a Grand Vizier, Lakhous, is an Arab of ordinary family but has great influence over his sovereign and is entirely in the hands of the French. In this situation, the Arab Prime Minister counsels the Bey as to the signature of laws presented to him. To give him time for no consideration, these decrees are handed him on a Thursday for promulgation on the following day.

-2-

We propose, by proper use of funds, to influence certain members of the family to unseat the present Prime Minister by family pressure brought on the old Bey, and to replace him by one who is known to be friendly to us and to the British. This is to be done on the condition that at least a week's consideration be availed of by the Bey before signing any decrees, and the Beylical entourage shall influence the old Prince either to withhold signature or to introduce changes in the laws to safeguard the interests of the total population.

Those on the spot believe that these mean a great deal of the supplies now going to the Bey and be as it would be impossible to gouge them from the producers without the Bey's assent or approval of operations.

We cannot guarantee that the artillerist can guarantee that the Bey will do so. However, it appears feasible and it is of all proportions to its cost.

-2-

We propose, by proper use of funds, to influence certain members of the family to unseat the present Prime Minister by family pressure brought on the old Bey, and to replace him by one who is known to be friendly to us and to the British. This is to be done on the condition that at least a week's consideration be availed of by the Bey before signing any decrees, and the Beylical entourage shall influence the old Prince either to withhold signature or to introduce changes in the laws to safeguard the interests of the total population.

Those on the spot believe that by these means a great deal of the supplies now going to Libya could be withheld, as it would be impossible to gouge them out of the local Arab producers without the Bey's assent or without undertaking armed operations.

We cannot guarantee that we can do this, any more than the artillerist can guarantee that his shell will hit the target. However, it appears feasible and it might produce results out of all proportions to its cost.

Mem 305
March 2, 1942
6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

We have arranged for a retired Army Air Corps officer to supervise personnel for securing and transmitting information of value on the situation in Africa which will include the following:

Bathurst, Freetown, Marshall, Morovia,
Fisherman's Lake, Takoradi, Accra,
which is also an army base, Lagos, Kano,
Maiduguri, Fort Lamy, El Ganeina,
El Fasher, Khartoun, Wadi Halfa, Cairo.

The plan of operations is being worked out and several cameras have been purchased for the use of the agents.

No. 182

January 24, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is one segment of our attack on North Africa. It deals with the Navy, and I propose to take it up with Admiral King:

I. Objectives:

1. The primary objective is to prepare the minds of officers and sailors of the French Fleet so that in the event of a German attempt to take over the Fleet they will:

- (a) desert with their ships to our side;
- (b) if it is not possible to rally the whole fleet, certain units will desert;
- (c) in the worst case, should the French Fleet ever come into contact with American Forces, their fighting morale will be low and the resistance opposed to us nominal.

2. In so doing, to avoid weakening or embarrassing in any way the present Vichy regime and to avoid compromising our present policy toward France which is based upon conditional support of the Vichy regime.

II. Specific Targets:

Propaganda intended to influence the French Navy should

-2-

be directed primarily at career officers actually serving in ships. It does not seem likely that the seamen in the French Fleet can be persuaded to do anything except carry out orders received from their superiors. At some French Naval stations there is evidence that officers between the ages of 30-40 years ranging in grade from Jr. Lieutenant to Lieutenant-Commanders, constitute a group particularly susceptible to American propaganda, but this does not appear to be true everywhere. In any case, it is the officers actually serving on board ship who are most important from the point of view of attaining the objectives listed above.

III. Channels:

Material transmitted by shortwave from this country will reach French Naval Officers throughout the world through three channels:

- (1) radio operators on ships will pick up some American programs and spread them around by word of mouth.
- (2) Officers of French Naval Intelligence will be listening to American broadcasts as part of their professional duties and will similarly discuss them in private conversations.
- (3) There will be a very substantial amount of collective listening in officers' ward-rooms particularly on board ship. The radio sets provided for the officers' wardroom are exceptionally powerful ones and adapted to

-3-

shortwave reception. There is greater likelihood of shortwave programs from this country being heard in French ports like Toulon than there is of the same programs being heard by the civilian population in France.

In Martinique and North Africa American programs are heard clearly and are widely listened to.

IV. Form of Broadcast:

The form of the broadcasts to the French Navy will be conditioned by the channels and the nature of the specific target. Since it is especially vital for us to reach officers serving on board ship, the third of the channels mentioned above--collective listening in wardrooms--is by far the most important. To utilize this channel it will be necessary to give the broadcasts such form and content that there is no danger of listening to them being forbidden. If the broadcasts are labeled or even obviously intended for French Naval Officers, there is serious danger that they will be banned at least at some stations.

(1) Immediately following a short program of music, there should be a special news commentary in French, which is to avoid anything of a subversive nature, but heavily slanting toward matters likely to interest naval listeners. For instance, comments on naval developments and naval warfare would be more frequent and carried in greater detail than in an ordinary commentary.

-4-

(2) Following the news commentary, there should be a short talk, in no case more than five minutes in length, which in most cases could be something quite innocuous and non-political--for instance, talks by or about movie stars who are popular in France--but which could be used on special occasions and infrequent intervals to carry a direct propaganda appeal in the form of a speech or statement. Historical subjects--especially from French Colonial and naval history--are particularly indicated.

(3) The principal propaganda instrument would obviously be the news commentary. There is reason to hope that following as it does immediately upon the musical program, it will be listened to by officers we wish to reach as they will always be able to say, if criticized for listening to American broadcasts, that they had only turned on the radio for the music and had forgotten to turn it off when the news started. Even so, great care must be taken not to betray the fact that we are addressing ourselves to "Naval Officers and above all, not to use any criticisms or attacks on the Vichy regime.

It is desired to ask the approval of the Navy Department with a view to the prompt inauguration of a detailed Radio program which due to its length, has been omitted from this particular memorandum.

If in principle the project is approved it is suggested

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that a representative of the Navy Department be assigned to cooperate closely with the Radio Division of the Office of the Coordinator of Information.

No. 184

January 24, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

From: William J. Donovan

As part of our penetration for Dakar we are arranging for a young Frenchman named Basset who has been Assistant to our Consul at Dakar for three years and who is now ready to return to Dakar, ostensibly representing Pan American Airways. Through him we are hopeful of not only establishing a line of communication but also some more affirmative action. When next I see you I can tell you more about this.

I have just arranged to get in by pouch a Sonatone hearing set for the French Governor of Dakar.

No. 179

January 24, 1942

8:30 A.M.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

The Flomarcy Company (which is owned by Bensaude, the Portuguese shipowner with whom we are working on West Africa) has been requested by the Post Office Department to consider carrying the U.S. Mails for Europe and the Azores in the vessels which it operates in a transatlantic service between New York, the Azores and Lisbon. Flomarcy is willing to do this but wants to do it on a basis which will enable it to assure the Post Office of regular and satisfactory service within the limits of existing emergency conditions and at the same time obtain a dependable minimum compensation.

The mails have a volume of about 3000 bags every two weeks, divided 1/3 First Class and 2/3 Third Class.

The Flomarcy Company would wish for this work a guaranteed minimum payment of \$20,000 for each voyage on which these mails were carried and would be willing to conclude an arrangement upon this basis, subject to the approval of the Portuguese Maritime Commission, which it is believed could be readily obtained.

If we could be assured of such service it would give us access to the Azores which we do not have now.

If you approve of this, I will take the matter up with Frank Walker.

No. 176

January 22, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

From: William J. Donovan

Yesterday I carried along further our negotiations relative to establishing communication between the Cape Verdes and the United States. We now have up with the Maritime Commission the question of obtaining a ship. We do not need more than 1500 or 2000 tons.

I have worked out arrangements with the Cape Verdians here and also with Bensaude, who is to obtain clearance with the Portuguese.

No. 143

January 9, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

The attached proposal I have submitted to both General Marshall and Admiral Stark. They approve. They think it essential and approve of this particular man. If you sanction it, please let me know as I think we should try to get him off at once.

1. It is proposed to send Colonel Charles Sweeny to Morocco to investigate and eventually to organize an uprising of native tribes against German occupation.

Colonel Sweeny was one of the organizers of the American Volunteer Corps in the French Army in 1914. He served in the Foreign Legion from 1914 to 1917, reaching the grade of Captain. He was attached to the Viviani-Joffre Mission to the United States in 1917. Transferred to the American Army, he served in France until after the Armistice.

In 1925 he served in Morocco in the Air Force and was Honorary Commander of the Sultan's Guard. During the operations against Abd-el-Krim that summer and autumn, he came to the Air Force in support of the columns engaged in the Quergha Valley and the Riff Mountains. The most active of these columns was commanded by Colonel Nogues. In execution of his mission, Sweeny attached himself to this column and, for three weeks, lived in the same tent with the Column Commander. This is the same Nogues who, today a full General, is Resident-General of Morocco. General Juin, Commander-in-Chief of the French Forces in North Africa, then a Captain, was Nogues' Chief of Staff. The three men have remained firm friends.

2. While in Marrakech, Colonel Sweeny knew intimately the three great Caids of the South: El Glaoui, El Gundalifi, and El M'Tigue. The latter two are now dead and El Glaoui remains Supreme Lord of the Atlas Mountains under the French.

El Glaoui, the Chief of the Glaoui tribe, was chosen ~~by the French~~ and First Resident General of Morocco.

-2-

to pacify and organize the territories of the Sus and the Atlas Mountains of Southern and South Eastern Morocco. It was Lyautey's policy to count on the great lard and religious chiefs more than on the force of arms. Even with this policy, it required 25 years to subdue the Atlas definitely.

El Glaoui, by this association with the French, has become a very wealthy man. French and English bankers estimate his wealth in the neighborhood of twenty-five million dollars. He is convinced that a German occupation of his country would entail the certain loss of his position and fortune. To attach him to our cause, arms and eventually money, would have to be supplied.

3. The tribesmen of the Atlas and of the Anti-Atlas Mountains towards the Sus and the Sahara Desert are very warlike. It would be possible to arm at least 100,000 of them, and possibly 250,000. The road system from Morocco to the South toward Dakar, passing through mountains and desert, is very open to attack by bands of guerrillas. The French, in spite of their long experience in colonial warfare, found this their greatest difficulty in the Conquest of Morocco. For example, Marshal Pétain required ten months and a force of 150,000 men and 30 batteries of 65 m/m mountain guns to put down the Abd-el-Krim insurrection of 1925-26. Native African troops and the Foreign Legion, men hardened to the desert heat and the

-3-

mountain cold, made up 90% of this force. Even then the operation was finally successful only because of the support of certain local tribes. The Germans, who know nothing of the art of colonial warfare would, at first, find the problem almost impossible of solution and would always be in difficulties. Colonel Sweeny does not feel that it would be possible to prevent the Germans from reaching Dakar once they had occupied Northern Africa, but he does feel that communications could be made extremely difficult and at times impossible.

4. As soon as it was certain that the Germans intended to occupy Northern Africa, rifles and machine guns would have to be landed on the Moroccan Coast in the region of Agadir, or further to the south.

Colonel Sweeny proposes to go to Morocco to contact El Glaoui and other friends in the tribes and among French Colonials. He will report with the least delay possible. Any effective plan will inevitably call for the landing on the Coast of requisite arms and munitions, an estimate of this would be furnished with report by Colonel Sweeny.

No. 136

January 6, 1942
6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The attached is a summary of statements made to us by General Robert J. Odic, former Commanding Officer of the French Air Force in Africa. General Odic is now with DeGaulle, and I understand will take over the Free French command very shortly in Africa.

SUMMARY OF STATEMENTS BY GENERAL ROBERT J. ODICNovember 12, 1941

Suez, being the key to the Near and Middle East theaters of war, is the prime objective of German action in the Mediterranean area. Tripoli is considered precarious and inadequate and therefore the Germans will attack Bizerta as the African port of entry. In order to hold Bizerta the Germans must occupy Algiers and Morocco. The taking of Casablanca and the Canaries would not be as important in the strategy planning as the capture of Bizerta.

Odic states that Weygand could be persuaded to join Allied action if he could be convinced of a reasonable certainty of success. He stated that at least ten Allied divisions would be necessary; and that a landing at Casablanca would not be effective unless the Germans could be prevented from landing and organizing in Tangier and Spanish Morocco. He feels that the Germans could make use of the Spanish and Spanish Moroccan armies; that those troops are better equipped than the French troops and are good soldiers.

November 26, 1941

General Odic stated that the present French command in Northwest Africa is still susceptible to an Allied

- 2 -

show of force and, within narrow limits, to Allied diplomacy. The dismissal of Weygand was not decisive.

A decisive British victory in Libya should be accompanied by an Allied effort to consolidate such anti-collaborationist forces as still remain in Northwest Africa.

If the British were successful in the western desert and push on to the Tunisian border, the first German move would be to send large forces through Tripoli and Bizerta. Drastic British action would be necessary across the Straits to prevent mobilization of German forces between the time of the completion of the present battle in the western desert and the transfer of substantial British forces to Tripoli. General Odic was not optimistic of British chances of consolidating the whole area from Tripoli to Egypt.

No. 129

January 5, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

The following is a copy of a cablegram which I have just received from our representative in Cairo:

"For Donovan only. Do not repeat until you hear from the President. Plans are being discussed here for French North Africa, involving every phase of propaganda needing printing and radio equipment in large quantities, also extensive carefully-selected personnel and organization, as anything British is poison to the French. This effort will have to be strictly an American one, as written reports on the way show British technical equipment to be very scarce. Will you cable details as available, so we can inform people here of our ability to meet requirements. You in Washington will know immediately whether recommendations and general plans being forwarded to the President are rejected or accepted."

No. 132

January 5, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

As I told you in my memorandum of January 3, I have talked with General Stilwell. I have already gotten in contact with the group here who are in close affiliation with the Cape Verdians and have also obtained two sea Captains who have been voyaging there and have some 16 mm. pictures of the islands. I had not previously been advised by the War Department of this situation, but I hope that we will have material on it for you within the next few days.

No. 123

January 3, 1942

12 M.

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The other day I advised you that General Marshall told me he was going to have General Stilwell come to see me. General Stilwell has done so, with his Chief of Staff. I told them that we were preparing to help on the attempted softening-up process of the territory with which we had to deal; that I thought we would be able to aid, particularly in three phases:

1. A plan of short-wave penetration. This we would work out by trying to have it reach its climax on "M Day."
2. The ascertainment of detailed information on particular parts of the territory that he had in mind.
3. The preliminary installation of a group that would be able to strike at the moment he would designate.

I told General Stilwell also that we would organize a task force made up, as he wished, of geographers, photographers, radio men, and representatives of our

No. 117

December 30, 1941.

8:30 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

We have arranged with the United Fruit Company officials to have all of their division heads cover the territory through Central America and report directly to us on the particular directives of the Army and Navy.

General Marshall has stated that he would like our Photographic Presentation Group take pictures of certain sections of Central America. This we are preparing to do.

I understand that the Budget is to submit their figures to you today for the two projects - the Azores and North Africa. We have negotiated today for some amphibians to use in going in there, and I think we have three planes located that would meet the requirements.

No. 111

December 26, 1941

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

With reference to the operation of the airline in the Azores, and also in the establishment of activities in North Africa, I have cleared the matter with Sumner Welles and also with General Marshall and General Arnold. An air officer has been assigned to help work out the details. In view of the fact that Sumner Welles is sending someone to deal with the French, we both thought it unwise, for the present, to send our man to deal with the native chiefs. General Marshall thought it wise to bring Major Peshkoff (who I think you know from the last war -- and the son of Gorky -- who was here on a mission for some time and who has gotten out of Africa, visited here and is now in London) for the purpose of having him advise us on the handling of those native chiefs. This I will take up with Sumner Welles. I must talk with the Budget about funds.

No. 600

June 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

You will recall your conversation with Minister Richard Casey early in April. Also my memorandum No. 400 dated April 13.

We have certain representatives of the British in Cairo now and they are working with Casey and his staff.

I have just received a message from Casey, a man in Cairo (Colonel Ellis), supported by Casey stating that a message is going forward from Cairo to London outlining a specific project for the carrying out of which about £750,000 in gold will be required. I understand it will be taken up with me in London. The suggestion has been made that the gold should remain in the hands of Casey. The question of the gold relates to the discussion which you had with Casey on that subject.

I wanted you to know about this and if possible to have some expression from you before I go in order that I may be guided accordingly in my talks. I have not yet seen the outline of the specific project for which this sum is requested, but as soon as I learn the particulars I will inform you.

Memoanda on North Africa

- 1) No. 600. June 9.
- 2) No. 562. May 29.
1st paragraph.
- 3) No. 524. May 22.
1st paragraph.
- 4) No. 512. May 18.
1st paragraph
- 5) No. 508. May 16.
page 1, c; page 4, d.

Nothing on:

- 1) Air line → Azores
- 2) Flouancy Co.)
Ben Sande
SS. Olivia

No. W-543.

June 9th, 1942.

TO: "Q"

Ellis cables that a case for the early provision of about \$750,000 in gold is being sent to S. O. London for discussion when you arrive.

Ellis states that there is a good case which is supported by the Minister of State who may telegraph you before you leave for London.

The suggestion is that the gold should remain in the hands of the Minister of State.

I should be very grateful if you will mention this matter to the President as you so kindly suggested when I spoke to you this morning.

No. 562
May 29, 1944
12 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is a report from our representative at the Joint Intelligence committee, reporting on the meeting held May 27th.

"The enemy's strength in Libya is greater than at any other time. Twice as many ships are now making direct Italy-Benghazi run as those taking the Italy-Tripoli route. The unloading capacity at Benghazi is now estimated at 3,000 tons daily. Enemy aircraft based at Crete are now operating on North Africa.

"Enemy concentration in North Norway continues. The Lutzow joins the Hipper at Narvik. Also there is an escort of six destroyers. The Tirpitz and Hipper with an inadequate escort of three destroyers at Trondheim. There is further movement of landing barges to North Norway. Other landing barges are going through the Heligoland light toward Norway. Enemy troops are

-2-

moving along the North Norwegian coast toward Finland.

"On Kharkov there has been nothing new reported. There have been further heavy withdrawals of enemy aircraft from the Crimea. Enemy landing craft have been observed moving up past Baltic.

"Cavendish-Bentinck reported investigation of French-Italian relations. They believe there is no evidence of Italian demands for French territory. Although strong political reasons exist for such demands the Italians are not dependent politically on the Germans to make demands. There is no evident grouping of the necessary military force. The course of most of the rumors concerning the conflict can be traced to the Tass agency in Switzerland.

"It is revealed that there has been a regrouping of Japanese naval units. The main force is in home waters and mandated islands, with a smaller force in North Japanese waters. The transports have returned to Rabaul and the force in the New Guinea area is greatly reduced.

-2-

Lutnow has moved from Kiel and is now north of Trondheim. In North Norway the long range bomber strength has been increased. The Russians make no attempt to bomb airports.

Kerch is in the hands of the enemy. Wholesale capture of Russians is denied. The Russian advance of 40 miles south-east of Kharkov is now endangered by the German drive further south toward the Russian rear. The Germans are thought to have ten tank divisions in the Ukraine. They have been forced to employ four tank divisions in the present action. The Germans have also withdrawn 300 aircraft from the Crimea. In the far north the Russians have been forced to withdraw from the river Lixa with heavy losses.

Replying to a direct question by an American Army representative, a poll of British representatives present revealed the belief that the chances are four to one against Japan's attacking Russia this summer. The Russians are believed to be slightly stronger in manpower with about equal armored and air strength. General McClure, United States Military Attache was informed by the Russian Air Attache in London that the Russians did not move or exchange troops from the Far East this winter as widely reported.

Joint Intelligence Committee subcommittee paper this week on Japanese merchant shipping concludes that a shortage of shipping facilities will not hamper the Japanese military operations

No. 512

May 18, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

Our representative at the weekly Joint Intelligence Committee meeting in London sends the following report as of May 15th.

*The enemy continues to strengthen his manpower in Libya at a rate of about 10,000 a month. A large part of these are airborne. They are maintaining the supply flowing from Italy. In the past week there have been four ships across to Tripoli, three to Benghazi, four from Tripoli to Benghazi. The week before that there were 30,000 tons across from Italy. Although the British representatives expressed themselves as not believing that a major Libyan attack is imminent, they think there may be some attempt on Tobruk, involving use of paratroops.

*Attacks on Malta should slacken. 6,000 tons of bombs

-2-

were dropped in April. During the past months the enemy has been forced to retain on the Eastern front additional forces believed to have been earmarked for Malta. Therefore the heavy attacks fell short of those required. During the past week Malta has been reinforced with 60 fighter planes and supply ships. There appears to be a shift in air activity to the Eastern Mediterranean. British destroyers, while hunting a convoy en route Aegean to Rhodes, were sunk off Crete by aircraft.

"The enemy is strengthening concentrations in Norway. They now have eight divisions there. These are thought to be defensive or in preparation for later joint action on Archangel and Murmansk. Supporting the latter hypothesis is the fact that the Admiral Scheer moved north last week, think to Narvik. The Hipper, Prinz Eugen and Tirpitz are still at Trondheim. The Eugen is damaged and not usable. The Hipper and Tirpitz exercised, while the Lutzow finished trials at Germany. Landing craft recently moved to North Norway and supply, repair ships have been sent to Narvik.

-3-

*The Russians continue to make progress in the river Lixa (possibly Luga or Neva) area. The Germans have considerable armament advantage in the South initial Russian manpower was probably greater. The German preparations for a major offensive had been continuing from Mariupol to Kursk sector. The Germans were not believed ready for their offensive until the end of May.

*British retreat in Burma to continue. Complete loss of heavy material forecast. Chinese operations in Burma are criticized by the English representatives on the grounds that they lacked organization and cohesion. The Chinese units fought separately and the employment of reserves was ill timed.

*The Japanese have moved most of their air squadrons from the Andaman Islands to Japan proper and have cancelled orders for certain fighters to move to the Andamans. Naval units have been moved from the Bay of Bengal, as the mandated islands harbor the bulk of the Japanese fleet.

No. 508

May 16, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

Following is the British Political Warfare Executive French Directive for the period ending May 31.

1. A unique attempt is made in this directive to cover fundamental objectives which are as follows:

- a. To demoralize the German military and civil forces of occupation.
- b. To hinder use by the enemy of French Economic resources.
- c. To convince the French people, and particularly those in the unoccupied zone that the government of Laval cannot be an independent power representing France itself, and that, because the Germans know they can make it do what they want, it is fostered by them.
- d. Restoration of French confidence in Britain and British policy particularly as regards post war policy.
- e. To convince the French that no territorial designs on the French Empire are held by the British.
- f. To maintain the morale of the French people and to prepare them for active cooperation with the allied forces of liberation.

-2-

2. Long-term tasks included in directive in order of priority as follows:

a. To treat air raid precaution measures at least twice a week for the purpose of diverting Nazi controlled anti-aircraft weapons from the Eastern Front and Germany to France. Material prepared by Political Warfare Executive will be forwarded and this campaign will be explained in full shortly. In the main, it is meant to create a demand for more protection against RAF raids in France.

b. At least once weekly, advice for German raids to be given.

c. To expose the real Nazi schemes and plans to Balkanize France.

d. Hints on scientific listening.

e. Admiralty themes for French mercantile fleet and French navy.

f. Economic exploitation of occupied countries and France by Germans.

g. Allied resources and war production, especially the United States.

h. Appeals to peasants which are intended to limit the movement of food from farms to cities.

i. Appeals to French youth.

-3-

3. The above long-term tasks were listed for the first time and, in subsequent discussions, are subject to revision. If our French section and planning board would send their views and list of long-term tasks and fundamental objectives for discussion and comparison here it would be useful.

4. In order of importance, PWE lists the following tasks for the coming fortnight:

a. By linking the following points, to convince the French people that all is not well in Germany.

1. German internal troubles, especially manpower problem.
2. Fear of RAF offensive by Germans.
3. Inability of Germans to face air warfare on all fronts.
4. German terrorism and oppression in France and all occupied countries.
5. Radio and press censorship in Europe to hide truth from France.
6. Comparison of German position in 1942 with that in 1940 (caution is given to prevent impression that an immediate crack-up in home front is at hand. This task is connected with the fundamental objective a.)

b. The myth of Laval's cleverness should be broken

c. The socialist new order of Europe which Germans and Laval are trying to sell to French workers should be debunked

-4-

This can be done by showing the new slave labor of conquered Europe and also the German methods of treating their own working classes and by stressing Laval's personal wealth and past life. Emphasis can also be placed on the progressively better position of British and American workers.

d. French should be convinced that no designs on French Colonial possessions are held by United Nations. This is linked with the fundamental objectives d and e, which must, during the present fortnight, become tasks. Also called for is constant repetition of American and British statements on Martinique and Madagascar.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Africa op. Plan
for [illegible]
8296
September 7, 1942

MEMORANDUM ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE FOR
NORTH AFRICA

Situation

Occupation of French North Africa either by the enemy or by our forces would have an important, perhaps decisive effect on the outcome of the war, providing the cost of the operation were not too high. The direct cost either for the enemy or for ourselves would be small since French forces in the region are not sufficient to offer strong resistance to the force which both the Germans and ourselves could muster.

Up to the present the enemy has refrained from attempting military occupation of this region for fear that:

1. Local French authorities would attempt to resist by force and would call upon United Nations forces to come to their assistance. Owing to the size of the area

-2-

there is serious risk to the enemy that before his occupation of North Africa could be completed, substantial United Nations forces would have arrived at Dakar, or vice versa.

2. The French Navy would go over to the side of the United Nations.

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On the available evidence, there is no reason to assume that the cost to the United Nations of attempting to occupy French North Africa against French opposition would be any less grave, or that the advantages gained would be greater in proportion.

It has been suggested, however, that consent of at least the local authorities could be gained under certain circumstances for cooperative military action with

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American forces. There is reason to believe that if these local authorities acquiesced, the French fleet, or a large part of it, would remain neutral or even come over to our side, while any hostile reactions in Vichy would be paralyzed by internal dissensions.

A group of high officers and officials in North Africa have informed American representatives on the spot that they are prepared to attempt to seize power and to invite in American forces (if properly supported and the American cooperation takes place under their conditions). Failure of such an attempt or its premature discovery might lead to German occupation. On the other hand, failure to support this French group at this time might lead to their discouragement, their disintegration as a group, and their future unavailability.

The final factor in the situation is the increasing control of French secret police loyal to the Vichy government over civilian and military activities in North Africa and in the increasing effectiveness of suppressive measures against pro-American elements. If this process

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continues, there is reason to fear that not only would an eventual American expedition be deprived of all assistance, but that the likelihood of active resistance to an enemy occupation will diminish to the point where it becomes acceptable in the eyes of enemy strategists.

In the light of this background any course of action which we adopt for North Africa must meet the following tests of suitability, in addition to the usual tests of feasibility.

A. It must not involve serious risk of bringing the French fleet into the war on the side of the enemy, or of causing local French authorities to invoke enemy assistance.

B. It must not allow the enemy to occupy French North Africa without automatically bringing the French fleet and army into action against him.

C. It must not provoke any substantial French military action against our own forces.

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Possible Courses of Action

1. To continue, or even to extend, the present policy of strengthening French resistance by means of diplomatic and economic support and psychological warfare.

2. To send an expeditionary force to occupy North Africa without political preparation but with all possible psychological warfare accompaniment.

3. To send an expeditionary force to occupy North Africa:

(a) After pro-American elements invite us to land;

(b) After organizing local reception committees of American sympathizers to assist landing operations without a general coup d'etat.

4. To encourage pro-American French group with which we are now in contact to begin making plans for a coup d'etat, to assist them with money and supplies and to promise support upon reasonable assurance that the plan can be executed.

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Acceptability of Courses

1. To continue or even to extend the present policy of strengthening French resistance by means of diplomatic and economic support and psychological warfare.

Advantages

A. No appreciable cost.

Disadvantages

A. The course offers no guaranty that resistance will be successfully maintained and involves the risk of gradual elimination of pro-American elements.

Conclusion: The course of action is acceptable but not suitable.

2. To send an expeditionary force to occupy North Africa without political preparation but with all possible psychological warfare accompaniment.

Advantages

A. Good chance that element of surprise could be preserved.

B. Intensive psychological warfare accompaniment might hold active local resistance to a minimum.

Disadvantages

A. American troops would arrive as invaders and would surely encounter some resistance.

B. French authorities would call in enemy forces before American occupation of the territory was completed, or at least oppose.

-7-

C. Serious risk that the French fleet would enter the war against us and possibility that Vichy would join the Axis, relieving enemy of part of his police burden.

D. America's moral position would be weakened.

Conclusion: The course of action is suitable as a technical military operation, but is not acceptable because of the risk that cost would outweigh the gains, and because of moral factors.

3. (a) To send an expeditionary force to North Africa after arranging in advance with pro-American elements to seize power and invite us to land.

Advantages

- A. American forces would arrive as Allies and would encounter little or no resistance if the coup d'etat were successful.
- B. The fleet would probably be neutral or might join us.
- C. If plans for the coup d'etat were discovered and crushed by Vichy

Disadvantages

- A. Lengthy political preparation of coup d'etat might reveal our plan to the enemy.

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authorities after the expedition had started, French opinion would still be too divided to make effective resistance likely.

- D. If enemy learned of plans in time to forestall us by occupying the region himself, he would encounter resistance and the fleet would probably join us; task of policing North Africa against bitterly hostile population would tax the enemy.

Conclusion: The course of action is suitable. It is acceptable unless revelation of the plan could occur in such a manner that the enemy could concentrate superior force at the points of landing without corresponding possibilities of cancelling the expedition if he commenced to do so.

3. (b) To send an expeditionary force to North Africa after organizing local reception committees of American sympathizers to assist landing operations without attempting a general coup d'etat.

Advantages

- A. By eliminating serious resistance at landing points, local reception

Disadvantages

- A. The reactions of the French fleet and French opinion generally might be as un-

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committees would enable us to confront the French with such overwhelming forces that resistance might seem useless.

favorable as in the case of Course 1.

- B. Rapidity of American occupation would reduce losses on both sides and it might be possible to establish a local French government which would cooperate.

- B. Risk of disclosure would be almost as serious as in Course 3(a).

Conclusion: The course has almost as many disadvantages as Course 3(a) without corresponding advantages. It is not acceptable as a planned course, but indicates a possibility of partially retrieving the advantages of Course 3(a) if the coup d'etat planned in that course were crushed on the eve of an American landing.

4. To encourage the pro-American French group with which we are now in contact to make their plans for a coup d'etat, to assist them with money and supplies, and actively to support them upon reasonable assurance that the plan can be executed.

Advantages

- A. The course has the same advantages as 3(a), with

Disadvantages

- A. Disclosure of plan might goad enemy into occupying

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the additional one that the date of the expedition can be withheld from the revolutionaries until preparations are well advanced. The enemy is more likely to be deceived and the whole enterprise will appear conjectural to him.

North Africa before we were ready to move.

- B. If a coup d'etat be attempted and fails, there is danger that we would incur greater resistance as a result of that failure than if a coup d'etat had not been attempted.
- B. If the enemy should learn our intentions and attempt to forestall us by occupying the area himself, it might be possible to hasten plans for the expedition so that we could arrive in one part of the region - e.g., Dakar - while he was still engaged in other parts.
- C. Successful enemy occupation of North Africa would be compensated by political gains and by increased strain on his resources.
- D. The course of action would maintain morale of pro-American elements in North Africa during preparation of coup d'etat and would gain us time.

Conclusion: The course of action is suitable and is acceptable.

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Recommendations

1. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff confer with the Secretary of State and with the President in order to determine high political policy to be followed in the course of operations, including

(a) The attitude to be adopted toward the French;

(b) Whether or not the Free French shall participate;

(c) The guarantees to be offered prior to the entry of troops;

(d) What, if any, pledges of respect for their territory shall be given to the Spaniards and the French.

2. That Robert D. Murphy, now Counselor of Embassy at Vichy and resident in Algiers (and who has actively participated in the operations of O.S.S. in North Africa) be designated as a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

(a) To report upon and recommend to the

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Joint Chiefs of Staff, French civil and military officers to whom should be entrusted the administration of North African affairs after the entry of our forces;

(b) To recommend such individuals of the French high command as could be relied upon to arrange for the taking over of control of the area;

(c) To recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff such influential person or persons as have been selected by the French leaders to be used to broadcast in French to the officers and civilians of French North Africa prior to or at the moment of entry of our forces;

(d) To arrange for such staff talks as would be desired by the Joint Chiefs of Staff between the Americans and the leaders of the French Separatist Movement.

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3. That Lieutenant Colonel William A. Eddy be designated as the senior military officer in the area to be entered, promoted to the rank of full Colonel and, under the advice and direction of Mr. Murphy,

(a) To maintain liaison with such French leaders as have set up friendly organized groups;

(b) To act as liaison officer on military and naval questions;

(c) To arrange and provide for arms and equipment for these groups;

(d) To continue his supervision of clandestine radio communications;

(e) To enter into arrangements for wireless communications between our stations in Tangier and Gibraltar or between Tangier and our convoys;

(f) To designate an assistant at Gibraltar for the earmarking of stores and small boats for supplying guerilla groups after the arrival of the assaulting divisions;

(g) To recommend for aid and assistance to

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the assaulting commanders, one of our agents from Algiers and one from Morocco to be available for each attacking party;

(h) To recommend at Algiers and Morocco representatives who would take charge in the event that anything should happen to the officers now in command in those places, or to the Director at Tangier.

William J. Donovan

DIRECTIVE

The Object

1. To prepare the ground for a negotiated agreement with the French authorities of sufficient standing to insure the entry and favorable reception of Allied forces in French North Africa.
2. To insure resistance by the French in the event of an Axis attack on French North Africa.
3. To stiffen French resistance meanwhile to Axis penetration and to counter Axis activities of all kinds.
4. To guard against premature action by patriots.

Note

The value of a welcome by French authorities will vary according to the ability of the Allied nations to take advantage of it. This will depend (1) upon Axis preoccupation elsewhere; (2) the extent of Allied commitments in other theaters; (3) the engagement of the Germans on the Russian Front (the time would be opportune for implementing an agreement with the French authorities, for while the scale of Allied resistance will be limited, effective Axis retaliation

-2-

would be difficult.

There should be a secret agreement whereby the General project and target date are determined in advance and sufficient time given to the Allies to make their preparations.

Our policy would be to give the maximum assistance possible. The extent, however, is dependent upon the two items mentioned in the paragraph next above.

What help can be given the French authorities:

- (1) Full economic and financial support.
- (2) They would be under no obligation to serve under General de Gaulle or the Free French National Committee.
- (3) The maintenance of an Allied force in North Africa would be impracticable without the cooperation of the French authorities and without at least the acquiescence of the French forces. No agreement for entry could be concluded unless the French negotiators carried sufficient authority to insure these conditions.
- (4) It is particularly important to avoid even local or sporadic resistance at the ports of entry. Although such resistance might be overcome by the Allied forces, the

-3-

resultant bloodshed would seriously prejudice subsequent cooperation.

Plans should be made beforehand to secure French, Axis and interned Allied shipping in French North Africa for Allied use.

Although every effort should be made to win over the Moorish population to the Allied cause, no promise of independence after the war should be made.

September 7, 1942

MEMORANDUM PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE FOR
NORTH AFRICA

Situation

Occupation of French North Africa either by the enemy or by our forces would have an important, perhaps decisive effect on the outcome of the war, providing the cost of the operation were not too high. The direct cost either for the enemy or for ourselves would be small since French forces in the region are not sufficient to offer strong resistance to the force which both the Germans and ourselves could muster.

Up to the present the enemy has refrained from attempting military occupation of this region for fear that:

1. Local French authorities would attempt to resist by force and would call upon United Nations forces to come to their assistance. Owing to the size of the area

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there is serious risk to the enemy that before his occupation of North Africa could be completed, substantial United Nations forces would have arrived at Dakar, or vice versa.

2. The French Navy would go over to the side of the United Nations.

3. Uprisings would occur in Metropolitan France which would oblige the German Army to take on the burden of policing all France.

For these and similar reasons the enemy has apparently judged that up to now the cost of occupying North Africa would outweigh the advantages.

On the available evidence, there is no reason to assume that the cost to the United Nations of attempting to occupy French North Africa against French opposition would be any less grave, or that the advantages gained would be greater in proportion.

It has been suggested, however, that consent of at least the local authorities could be gained under certain circumstances for cooperative military action with

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American forces. There is reason to believe that if these local authorities acquiesced, the French fleet, or a large part of it, would remain neutral or even come over to our side, while any hostile reactions in Vichy would be paralyzed by internal dissensions.

A group of high officers and officials in North Africa have informed American representatives on the spot that they are prepared to attempt to seize power and to invite in American forces (if properly supported and the American cooperation takes place under their conditions). Failure of such an attempt or its premature discovery might lead to German occupation. On the other hand, failure to support this French group at this time might lead to their discouragement, their disintegration as a group, and their future unavailability.

The final factor in the situation is the increasing control of French secret police loyal to the Vichy government over civilian and military activities in North Africa and in the increasing effectiveness of suppressive measures against pro-American elements. If this process

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continues, there is reason to fear that not only would an eventual American expedition be deprived of all assistance, but that the likelihood of active resistance to an enemy occupation will diminish to the point where it becomes acceptable in the eyes of enemy strategists.

In the light of this background any course of action which we adopt for North Africa must meet the following tests of suitability, in addition to the usual tests of feasibility.

A. It must not involve serious risk of bringing the French fleet into the war on the side of the enemy, or of causing local French authorities to invoke enemy assistance.

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Possible Courses of Action

1. To continue, or even to extend, the present policy of strengthening French resistance by means of diplomatic and economic support and psychological warfare.

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Acceptability of Courses

1. To continue or even to extend the present policy of strengthening French resistance by means of diplomatic and economic support and psychological warfare.

Advantages

- A. No appreciable cost.

Disadvantages

- A. The course offers no guaranty that resistance will be successfully maintained and involves the risk of gradual elimination of pro-American elements.

Conclusions: The course of action is acceptable but not suitable.

2. To send an expeditionary force to occupy North Africa without political preparation but with all possible psychological warfare accompaniment.

Advantages

- A. Good chance that element of surprise could be preserved.
- B. Intensive psychological warfare accompaniment might hold active local resistance to a minimum.

Disadvantages

- A. American troops would arrive as invaders and would surely encounter some resistance.
- B. French authorities would call in enemy forces before American occupation of the territory was completed, or at least oppose.

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C. Serious risk that the French fleet would enter the war against us and possibility that Vichy would join the Axis, relieving enemy of part of his police burden.

D. America's moral position would be weakened.

Conclusion: The course of action is suitable as a technical military operation, but is not acceptable because of the risk that cost would outweigh the gains, and because of moral factors.

3. (a) To send an expeditionary force to North Africa after arranging in advance with pro-American elements to seize power and invite us to land.

Advantages

A. American forces would arrive as Allies and would encounter little or no resistance if the coup d'etat were successful.

B. The fleet would probably be neutral or might join us.

C. If plans for the coup d'etat were discovered and crushed by Vichy

Disadvantages

A. Lengthy political preparation of coup d'etat might reveal our plan to the enemy.

authorities after the expedition had started, French opinion would still be too divided to make effective resistance likely.

- D. If enemy learned of plans in time to forestall us by occupying the region himself, he would encounter resistance and the fleet would probably join us; task of policing North Africa against bitterly hostile population would tax the enemy.

Conclusion: The course of action is suitable. It is acceptable unless revelation of the plan could occur in such a manner that the enemy could concentrate superior force at the points of landing without corresponding possibilities of cancelling the expedition if he commenced to do so.

3. (b) To send an expeditionary force to North Africa after organizing local reception committees of American sympathizers to assist landing operations without attempting a general coup d'etat.

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Conclusion: The course has almost as many disadvantages as Course 3(a) without corresponding advantages.

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North Africa before we were ready to move.

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- E. If the enemy should learn our intentions and attempt to forestall us by occupying the area himself, it might be possible to hasten plans for the expedition so that we could arrive in one part of the region - e.g., Dakar - while he was still engaged in other parts.
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Recommendations

1. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff confer with the Secretary of State and with the President in order to determine high political policy to be followed in the course of operations, including

- (a) The attitude to be adopted toward the French;
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Joint Chiefs of Staff, French civil and military officers to whom should be entrusted the administration of North African affairs after the entry of our forces;

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September 7, 1942

MEMORANDUM ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE FOR
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Situation

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OFFICE OF STRATEGY

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC PLANNING

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

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Joint Chiefs of Staff, French civil and military officers to whom should be entrusted the administration of North African affairs after the entry of our forces;

(b) To recommend such individuals of the French high command as could be relied upon to arrange for the taking over of control of the area;

(c) To recommend to the Joint Chiefs of Staff such influential person or persons as have been selected by the French leaders to be used to broadcast in French to the officers and civilians of French North Africa prior to or at the moment of entry of our forces;

(d) To arrange for such staff talks as would be desired by the Joint Chiefs of Staff between the Americans and the leaders of the French Separatist Movement.

-13-

OFFICE OF ~~OPERATIONS~~ SERVICE

3. That Lieutenant Colonel William A. Eddy be designated as the senior military officer in the area to be entered, promoted to the rank of full Colonel and, under the advice and direction of Mr. Murphy,

(a) To maintain liaison with such French leaders as have set up friendly organized groups;

(b) To act as liaison officer on military and naval questions;

(c) To arrange and provide for arms and equipment for these groups;

(d) To continue his supervision of clandestine radio communications;

(e) To enter into arrangements for wireless communications between our stations in Tangier and Gibraltar or between Tangier and our convoys;

(f) To designate an assistant at Gibraltar for the earmarking of stores and small boats for supplying guerilla groups after the arrival of the assaulting divisions;

(g) To recommend for aid and assistance to

-14-

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

the assaulting commanders, one of our agents from Algiers and one from Morocco to be available for each attacking party;

(h) To recommend at Algiers and Morocco representatives who would take charge in the event that anything should happen to the officers now in command in those places, or to the Director at Tangier.

William J. Donovan

W. C. Eddy, Chief of Staff 9962
Project NA-1
Approved
x Eddy

SECRET

January 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM TO THE CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AIR FORCES
EQUIPMENT OF THE DEFENSES ASSIGNMENTS
COMMITTEE (AIR):

Subject: Approval of Office of
Strategic Services Project
NA-1.

Office of Strategic Services Project NA-1
has the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which
was granted on April 21, 1942.

JOHN R. DRANE,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Secretary.

Distribution:

Capt. Royal

COB [unclear]

ES [unclear]

COB [unclear]

COB [unclear]

COB [unclear]

COB [unclear]

COB [unclear]

COB [unclear]

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COB [unclear]

SECRET

T O R C H

AND THE S.O.E. SIGNALS STATIONS AT GIBRALTAR

This is the story of TORCH as told in the signals exchanged with the C.S.S.-S.O.E. wireless operators through the S.O.E. stations at Gibraltar. From the beginning of the operation this was the sole wireless channel between Gibraltar and North Africa (1).

THE NETWORK

The cables to and from London, Tangier, Madrid and Lisbon were sent by Cable and Wireless. The other signals were received and transmitted through the S.O.E. stations in the tunnels of Gibraltar.

The following were the operators in North Africa:-

AMERICAN

PILGRIM at Tunis (American Consulate).
YANKEE at Algiers (American Consulate).
FRANKLIN at Oran.
LINCOLN at Casablanca.

BRITISH

ANGEL at Casablanca.
DEVIL at Oran.
SATYR at Algiers.

These three S.O.E. signals detachments were landed with the three Task Forces.

THE SECRET MEETING

On October 19th 1942 GENERAL CLARK, BRIGADIER-GENERALS LEWITZER and HAMBLIN, COLONEL HOLMES and CAPTAIN WRIGHT (U.S. Navy) arrived at Gibraltar and left the same night for Tangier in a submarine commanded by LIEUTENANT JEWEL (R. .), expecting to land on the 21st or 22nd for a meeting with MR. MURPHY and GENERAL MAST, the representative of GENERAL GIRAUD. The party stood off the rendezvous point submerged for 36 hours, waiting for the signal to land; definite contact was finally established and with favourable weather they landed in four canvas canoes about midnight on the 21st (2).

The discussions passed off well, all questions being satisfactorily settled except the time of the assumption by

- (1) Gibraltar 157 to London of 7.11.42.
- (2) Gibraltar 62 to London of 19.10.42.
- Gibraltar 30 to Tangier (repeated to London 64) of 19.10.42.
- Yankee 1 and 3 (from Murphy) of 21.10.42.
- Gibraltar 38 to Tangier (repeated to London 70) of 21.10.42.
- Gibraltar 79-80 to London of 24.10.42.

the French of supreme command, and MAST was to get in touch with GIRAUD whose decision was expected to be favourable. The discussions showed that the operational plan was sound, and the necessity to be prepared to occupy Tunisia promptly with airborne units was abundantly confirmed. It was anticipated that there would be little French resistance whether GIRAUD assumed leadership in North Africa or not. CLARK promised MAST to deliver 2,000 small arms with ammunition to the vicinity of the landing place, and also to send a submarine (which the French insisted must be American) to bring GIRAUD from France to North Africa (3).

The conference lasted throughout the day. At 7.0 p.m. it was interrupted by the local police and the American party were obliged to hide in the wine cellar, which proved to be empty. After two hours they made their way to the embarkation point and at the third effort at 4.30 a.m. on the 23rd regained the submarine, two boats having capsized, one having been damaged and GENERAL CLARK having lost his coat and trousers, though these were subsequently recovered (4).

THE FRENCH VIEWPOINT

On November 2nd a letter, which had been approved by the Commander-in-Chief on October 27th, was sent by MURPHY to GIRAUD. It affirmed the intention of the United Nations to restore the full sovereignty of France but pointed out the necessity for American military command from 48 hours after the landing until the establishment of the security of French North Africa and of the necessary base. During this time the U.S. Government would make every effort to furnish the French forces with modern arms and equipment. At the same time MURPHY was authorised to give GIRAUD or MAST the assault date and the name of the Commander-in-Chief on November 4th, and he was told that whether or not GIRAUD accepted the invitation to go to North Africa MAST was acceptable as deputy to the Commander-in-Chief. On GIRAUD's accepting MAST was told the date and name (5).

Meanwhile the seeds of trouble were sprouting. GIRAUD, complaining that at a conference on October 22nd his military experts had been given to understand that an operation was being considered when in fact it had already been decided and begun, suggested that the present proposition amounted to an ultimatum of hostile action; and MAST in an indignant letter to MURPHY in which he passed over in silence "la brutalité du procédé, particulièrement sensible aux coeurs ulcérés des français battus" complained that GIRAUD found himself in a position where it was impossible for him to co-ordinate French resistance and where there was a danger of setting France and its metropolitan army against French Africa and the French African army. Furthermore it was evident from an Accord de Principe signed by GIRAUD on October 27th and from MAST's letter that the French were envisaging an almost simultaneous

(3) Gibraltar 79-90 to London of 24.10.42.

(4) Gibraltar 79-90 to London of 24.10.42.

Yankee 1 and 2 (from Murphy to Gibraltar) of 23.10.42.

Gibraltar 95 to London (from Murphy) of 27.10.42.

(5) London 6839-6890, 6912 and 6927 to Gibraltar of 27, 28 and 31.10.42.

Letter from Murphy to Mast of 2.11.42.

Yankee 5 (Murphy to Eddy for Eisenhower) of 5.11.42.

landing on the south coast of France itself, and it was felt that this bridge-head had now been lost. In spite of clear indication that operations on the continent could not accompany the North African campaign GIRAUD, though agreeing to yield if given sufficient time to make his preparations, continued to stress his opinion that at any rate a token party of American or British troops should be sent to southern France, and he stated that his instructions in the event of a general occupation by the Germans were "Resistance" (6).

EVACUATION OF GIRAUD

Although the French had insisted on an American submarine for the evacuation of GIRAUD it was unable to arrive in time and therefore on October 27th the same British submarine which carried GENERAL CLARK's party left Gibraltar, under the command of CAPTAIN WRIGHT (U.S.N.), at 3.0 p.m. to arrive at the Gulf of Lyons on the 31st, the earliest possible rendezvous night. No rendezvous or recognition signal had, however, been fixed by the 31st, and at midnight that day MR. MURPHY cabled GENERAL EISENHOWER that GIRAUD's messenger had returned from Marseille to report that it was utterly impossible for GIRAUD to depart until about November 20th. MURPHY, after heated discussion with MAST, was convinced that they should yield as TORCH would be a catastrophe without a favourable French High Command and a delay of two weeks was insignificant compared with the result of serious opposition from the French army. On November 4th however MURPHY was told that arrangements had been made through British channels to pick up GIRAUD that night or the following night, and that he would reach North Africa via Gibraltar on the 8th. A rendezvous point was fixed between Cap d'Antibes and Nice and GIRAUD's party were to be in a small boat 1 1/2 kilometres from the shore: they were to arrive at a point 17 kilometres west of Cherchell not later than the night of the 6th. GIRAUD arrived at Gibraltar on the 7th and sent a cable through YANKEE to MAST ordering him to get in touch with GENERAL BOUSCAT, DARTOIS at Maison Blanche, GERARDOT at Tunis, KOENIG-SCHWARTZ at Maroc and BESNARD at Agadir. He asked for a French plane to take him to Algiers, but eventually on the 8th he left, armed with two S.O.E. automatics, in a British Hudson escorted by fighters. Complete agreement had been reached (7).

- (6) London 6912 to Gibraltar of 28.10.42.
 Murphy 1 to Gibraltar for Eisenhower of 31.10.42.
 Letter from Mast to Murphy of 2.11.42.
 London 6946 to Gibraltar of 8.11.42.
 Gibraltar 2958 to London of 9.11.42.
- (7) Gibraltar 79-90, 100 and 102 to London of 24 and 27.10.42.
 London 6889-6890, 6917, 6927, 6929 and 6937 to Gibraltar of 27, 29 and 31.10.42 and 4.11.42.
 Yankee unnumbered (for Eisenhower) of 4.11.42.
 6 to Yankee (for Murphy) of 4.11.42.
 Yankee 7 (from Murphy to Eddy for Eisenhower) of 4.11.42.
 Yankee unnumbered (from Murphy to Eisenhower) of 5.11.42.
 Yankee 5 (from Murphy to Eddy for Eisenhower) of 5.11.42.
 Yankee 1 (from Maigne-Dubreuil through Murphy to Eddy for Giraud) of 6.11.42.
 3 to Franklin (for Knight from Eddy) of 7.11.42.
 Unnumbered to Lincoln (for King from Eddy) of 7.11.42.
 Yankee 1 and 3 (from Murphy to Eddy for Eisenhower) of 7.11.42.
 Unnumbered to Yankee of 7.11.42.
 Unnumbered to Yankee (to Murphy for Mast) of 7.11.42.
 3 to Yankee of 8.11.42 (2).
 7 to Yankee of 8.11.42.

PICNIC

PICNIC was an operation to land 10 tons of small arms, ammunition etc. from Gibraltar to a point 17 kilometres west of Cherchell lighthouse. A small armed surface vessel with the necessary boats was to be off the rendezvous point at 8.30 p.m. on November 2nd. The reception party waited in vain on that night, and the following night the vessel from Gibraltar arrived but found no reception on the shore. The rendezvous was then changed to a point 35 kilometres east of Algiers, 3 kilometres east of Alma Marine, but again there was no success, though at 1.0 a.m. on the morning of November 6th a small boat was seen 500 metres off shore (8).

WIRELESS ARRANGEMENTS

To signal the landing date of TORCH arrangements were made for a two-way channel for radio communication between a transmitter within the TORCH theatre and a station at Gibraltar, the receivers on watch with each of the Task Forces being charged to copy the traffic and bring it to the attention of their commanders. But to guard against a breakdown the receivers FRANKLIN, YANKEE and LINCOLN at Oran, Algiers and Casablanca respectively were instructed to listen to the B.B.C. French and North African programmes for such messages as "Ecoutez, Franklin, Robert est 24 heures en retard", ROBERT being the code-name for the landing. These signals were to begin two days before the landing and were to be continued and modified as necessary every hour or so (9).

During the operation itself the U.S. Army messages were largely handled by ANGEL, the S.O.E. signals detachment at Casablanca, as they were having trouble with their radio to Gibraltar. This station also handled the priority traffic of ADMIRAL HALL, the Naval chief at Casablanca, as he had lost his radio gear, and HALL thanked all concerned in passing his important traffic, saying that their efficiency and speed had proved invaluable in his operations during a difficult period (10).

In addition to those specifically mentioned in this brief report many other operational messages passed through the O.S.S.-S.O.E. channel, such as the arrangements to drop paratroops to capture La Senia and Tafaroui aerodromes, the decision to use French local troops to occupy Oran port and to do jobs entailing possible bloodshed, the arrangements to seize aeroplane petrol at Perregaux, the suggestion to seize air fields at Casablanca, Meknes, Marakesh and Port Lyautey, a

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- (8) Murphy 2 and 4 to Gibraltar of 29.10.42.
1 and 3 to Yankee (for Murphy) of 30.10.42.
Yankee 1 (Murphy to Gibraltar) of 31.10.42.
Murphy 3 to Eddy of 3.11.42.
Murphy unnumbered to Eddy (received 3.11.42).
Yankee 3 and 10 (Murphy to Eddy) of 3.11.42.
Unnumbered to Yankee of 4.11.42.
Yankee unnumbered of 4.11.42.
Unnumbered to Yankee of 4.11.42.
Yankee 7 (Murphy to Eddy) of 6.11.42.
 - (9) London 136 to Tangier and Gibraltar of 20.10.42.
London 184 to Gibraltar (repeated to Tangier 126) of 2.11.42.
1, 2 and 3 to Yankee, Franklin and Lincoln of 4.11.42.
Unnumbered (for Eddy) of 7.11.42.
 - (10) Unnumbered of 14, 21, 22 and 25.11.42.

warning about the mined in Algiers, instructions about delivering, FRANKLIN RECOVERED the message to the REY OF TUNISIA, and the priority signals to be displayed by French forces willing to co-operate with the Allies (11).

THE APPROACH

On November 4th LINCOLN (at Casablanca) cabled a message from EDDY that an important part of the Military High Command of Morocco had decided to co-operate and a staff officer should be sent secretly for a conference. As a result of talks between KING (O.S.S. representative at Casablanca) and GENERAL BETHOUARD the French general staff at Casablanca were entirely in agreement with the operation and were planning for a landing between Safi and Port Lyautey to surround Casablanca, occupy air fields and then to negotiate with the Navy. EDDY replied that the projected operation conformed closely to this conception and that the time of attack was 4.0 a.m. on November 8th. The landings were to be at Safi, Fedala, Mehdiya, Port Lyautey, Sale and adjacent aerodromes (12).

On November 7th LINCOLN cabled that he had heard the ROBERT signal. YANKEE was also informed that zero hour for Morocco would be 4.0 a.m. on November 8th. PILGRIM (O.S.S. operator at the American Consulate, Tunis) and YANKEE (O.S.S. operator at the American Consulate, Algiers) took the signal that operations in Algiers would start at 1.0 a.m., three hours before the Moroccan landings (13). The same day FRANKLIN (the O.S.S. operator at Oran) cabled a report from KNIGHT (the O.S.S. representative) that the situation at Oran was developing badly. The local General had discovered the organisation, the Chief of Staff of the Oran Division was under virtual arrest and a full state of alert existed. EDDY encouraged him with the news that GIRAUD would reach Algiers the following day, but the FRANKLIN operator reported that there might be fighting unless new factors, such as orders from GIRAUD, appeared, and his

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- (11) London 106 to Tangier (repeated to Gibraltar 150) of 24.10.42.
 Franklin 3 of 3.11.42.
 Franklin 4 (for Eddy) of 3.11.42.
 Tangier 80 and 83 to Gibraltar (for Eddy) of 5.11.42.
 London 198 to Gibraltar (for Eddy and Franklin) of 5.11.42.
 Unnumbered to Pilgrim (for Doolittle) of 6.11.42.
 Franklin unnumbered (for Eddy) of 7.11.42.
 Unnumbered to Yankee, Pilgrim, Franklin and Lincoln of 7.11.42.
 Gibraltar 157 to London of 7.11.42.
 - (12) Lincoln 1 (for Eddy from King) of 4.11.42.
 5 to Lincoln (for King from Eddy) of 4.11.42.
 Tangier 78 to Gibraltar (for Eddy from King) of 5.11.42.
 Tangier 79 and 80 to Gibraltar (for Eddy) of 5.11.42.
 Yankee 4 (Murphy to Eddy for Clark) of 6.11.42.
 Unnumbered to Lincoln (for King from Eddy) of 6.11.42.
 Lincoln 1 (for Eddy from King) of 7.11.42.
 Unnumbered to Lincoln (for King from Eddy) of 7.11.42.
 Unnumbered to Lincoln (for King from Eddy) of 6 and 7.11.42.
 - (13) Unnumbered to Pilgrim (for Doolittle from Eddy) of 7.11.42.
 Unnumbered to Pilgrim (for Doolittle from Eddy) of 7.11.42.
 Lincoln 5 (for Eddy from Reid) of 7.11.42.
 Yankee 4 (from Murphy to King) of 7.11.42.
 Unnumbered to Yankee (from Eddy to Murphy) of 7.11.42.
 Gibraltar unnumbered to Lisbon, Madrid and Tangier of 7.11.42.

might be out any time (14).

THE ATTACK

At 1.0 a.m. November 7th the situation was that simultaneous operations were expected on Oran and practically certainly on Algiers, Casablanca and Bone. In Morocco they were expecting the converging operation on Casablanca and Port Lyautey followed by negotiations with the Navy to avoid the bloodshed and destruction of port facilities involved in a frontal attack (15).

In the event the beach landings at Oran were successful, though the coast defences and naval units resisted strongly, and Tafaroui aerodrome was captured. On the west coast similar resistance was encountered at first. Troops landed at Fedala and Saffi. By midnight Algiers was quiet, the Navy was on guard and GENERAL JUIN had asked MURPHY to call: MURPHY intended to tell him that he would be responsible for any bloodshed resulting from resistance and would be acting contrary to GIRAUD's orders (16).

An American party of four took a small fortress at the entrance to Alger and were surrounded by the DARLAN police who used gas to dislodge them. A request was made for six armoured cars which would clean up the situation (17).

On November 9th it was announced that GENERAL CLARK and a staff of about fourteen were arriving to set up an advance headquarters in Algiers. As EISENHOWER's personal representative he would have power to confirm any arrangement with DARLAN to halt all resistance throughout French North Africa. At the conversations between DARLAN, MURPHY and JUIN a number of broad hints were thrown out by DARLAN about the formation of a provisional North African administration. He made numerous reflections on GIRAUD and the British and said he would only deal with American generals. MURPHY observed that a provisional government headed by DARLAN would not evoke great popular enthusiasm but he did have command of the fleet. DARLAN and JUIN had expressed bitter regret that they had been taken by surprise, saying that if we had waited only two weeks a French proposal would have been made officially which would have eliminated any French resistance and would probably have afforded the co-operation of the French fleet (18).

On the 11th it was reported that DARLAN and MICHELIER had ordered the Cease Fire (19).

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- (14) Franklin 2 (for Eddy) of 7.11.42.
 - 3 to Franklin (for Knight from Eddy) of 7.11.42.
 - Franklin unnumbered (for Eddy) of 7.11.42.
 - (15) Oran unnumbered (Murphy to Eddy for Giraud) of 7.11.42.
 - (16) 6 to Yankee of 8.11.42.
 - Yankee unnumbered of 8.11.42 (2).
 - Yankee unnumbered (from Murphy to Eddy) of 8.11.42.
 - Yankee 1 of 9.11.42.
 - (17) Yankee unnumbered of 8.11.42.
 - (18) Unnumbered to Yankee of 9.11.42.
 - Yankee 1 of 9.11.42.
 - (19) Unnumbered to Pilgrim of 11.11.42.

- 7 -

TUNIS

In Tunis the American Consul DOOLITTLE and his Vice-Consul UTTER were in forced residence from November 10th, and reports were received of troop carrying planes and troop ships bringing German soldiers from Sicily. By the 11th over 200 German planes of all kinds had landed without opposition. The same day ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM addressed an appeal to ADMIRAL ESTEVA to use his forces to expel the Germans from Tunisia, adding that the Allied Commander-in-Chief gave a definite undertaking to come to his help with all his forces by land, sea and air. On the 13th DOOLITTLE reported that the army was ready to co-operate with Anglo-American forces. (20).

POSTSCRIPT

On November 15th GENERAL BETHOUARD asked that GENERAL GIRAUD should be told that the failure of the operations planned had been due to delay in landing, the non-appearance of the Americans at Rabat where they were expected and the absence of a proclamation by GIRAUD in the morning. BETHOUARD and his military and civilian collaborators were detained at El Hajeb, awaiting court martial at Meknes, and GENERAL FOGUES had refused to set them free (21).

(20) Pilgrim numbered of 10, 11 and 13.11.42.

(21) Numbered 8 to Yancoo (for Murphy through Eddy for King)
31.11.42.

File
April 1942
October 20, 1942

Major General George V. Strong,
Senior Member, Joint Security Control,
Room 2416, Munitions Bldg.,
War Department,
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Strong:

I am attaching copy of cable from Eddy relative to the matter of funds in his area.

I have never known the reason for the prohibition by Security Control of the manner in which we had been handling funds in that area. I cannot now understand why it should be prohibited. Nevertheless, I have held him strictly to the orders of the Security Control.

After I talked with you it was my impression that this prohibition was not to continue for any length of time.

As you can see from this report, there is involved a question of fulfilling our obligations, and the further question of how the failure of fulfillment may jeopardize the operation.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

By Authority A. C. 2014, 5-2


Date 10/11/42 *gpl*
Africa bath 253.7
x Eddy 100
x Purchase
French - 100

October 11, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR OF STRATEGIC SERVICES.

FROM: JOINT SECURITY CONTROL.

Reference your memorandum of October 10, in which you quoted a message from Colonel Eddy in regard to resumption of purchase of Algerian francs. Please inform Eddy that no North African currency will be purchased against free dollar credit unless and until ordered by Theater Commander.



GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Senior Member, Joint Security Control.



SECRET

October 10, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR JOINT SECURITY CONTROL

FROM: Director of Strategic Services

The following message has been received today from Lieutenant Colonel Eddy at Tangier, relayed through London:

"Murphy arrived with message. Information that purchase of Algerian francs against free dollar credit had been ordered stopped caused him to express surprise. Instructions from highest authority had authorized their purchase. It is hoped that permission will be granted for me to resume purchase."

William J. Donovan
Director

africa with
x Gold
x Purchase
x Funds
x I don't

October 3, 1942

MEMORANDUM

FOR: Joint Security Control
FROM: Director, Office of Strategic Services

In accordance with your memorandum of October 2nd, Colonel Eddy has been advised that he is not permitted to purchase North African currency under the procedure stated in my memorandum of October 1st, and has been again instructed to purchase no currency until we are advised by you to resume.

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

By Authority A. G. of S., Genl.

WAR DEPARTMENT**WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON**Date 10/2/42 (RD)

Africa No. 32

x Col Eddy

x P. W. C.


x J. W. C.

x J. S. C.

October 2, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES.**FROM: SECURITY CONTROL.**

Reference your memorandum, October 1, 1942, on subject of purchasing French francs in Africa. The time has not yet come when francs can be purchased in North Africa against free dollar credit even though no written receipts of currency are involved. It is requested that Colonel Eddy be advised that the procedure, referred to in paragraph 2 of your memorandum, is not permitted. You will be advised at the earliest possible date when clearance can be given on the purchase of North African currency in North Africa or elsewhere.



GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General, U.S.A.,
Senior Member, Joint Security Control.

**SECRET**

Africa house
in Zed, 10
Perdona
X Fina
X J...

October 1, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR: Security Control

FROM: Director, Office of Strategic Services

On September 23 you directed us in writing to have Colonel Eddy cease the purchasing of French francs in Africa until further notice. Acting upon oral instructions previously given by General Strong we had directed Colonel Eddy to cease such purchases until he was advised to resume.

Today we received a message from Colonel Eddy stating that his method of purchasing was to purchase francs in Algiers against free dollar credit in the United States. This was pursuant to the method that I had taken up with Security Control. Colonel Eddy points out again that no written receipts of currency are involved and asks if this procedure cannot be permitted. Will you please advise us whether the time has now come when such procedure can be followed or shall we again advise Colonel Eddy that this procedure is not permitted.

William J. Donovan
Director

September 23, 1942

MEMORANDUM TO: Security Control
FROM: Director of Office of Strategic Services

Your communication of September 23
is received.

Instructions have been cabled
Colonel Eddy directing that he cease purchasing
of French francs in North Africa until further
notice. No purchases will be made until we
are advised by proper authority to resume
purchases.

G. Edward Burton

Assistant Director of O.S.S.

cc to:
Captain Dyer

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION 6-2
WASHINGTON

By Authority of A. J. C. S. 1-2

Date 9/23/42 (Reg.)

O'Brien - 8531

x Zelde


September 23, 1942. x Frenchman

x Frenchman

x J. S. G. 6.1

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WILLIAM J. DONOVAN:**Subject: Joint Security Control.**

Reference verbal instructions to Mr. Wilson in your absence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct that, until further instructions from Joint Security Control, there will be no purchases of North African currency by the O.S.S. under the authority granted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on September 11. It is suggested that specific instructions to this effect be given by you to Colonel Eddy. Please acknowledge.



GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Senior Member, Joint Security Control.

**SECRET**

MEMORANDUM ABOUT FRANCE IN NORTH AFRICA

The American policy in French North Africa has certainly been clear-sighted and skillful. It was necessary to help North Africa for two reasons besides the human incentive.

The first was to help Marshal Petain resist the politicians who wished to drive him into military collaboration with Germany. He has certainly used the valuable argument which American generosity gave him; if we submit further to Germany, we will lose the help which allows us to keep and make live our most beautiful colony.

The second reason was to encourage General Weygand by helping him to succeed in his mission and persevere in his attitude of neutrality and independence, protecting North Africa in this manner, as long as possible, against German control.

However, if this policy was to bear fruit (and in fact it has) up to the present, it was an illusion to believe that Weygand would go so far as to secede from Vichy if the occasion arose.

The attitude of the former Generalissimo has never varied and we had warned our American friends of this for more than a year. He was the principal author of the Armistice and he absolutely approved of the internal policy of the new regime. Therefore he submitted to Marshal Petain with the total discipline which is the rule of the army. He was capable of, and did not fail to, speak with authority in the centers of the Government against the

deviations from the policy on which the regime had been founded. He certainly protested, - and that was the reason why he was sent to Africa at the suggestion of his enemy, Pierre Laval - against the abasement policy of France in relation to Germany. He certainly contributed to prevent or delay certain abominable actions which Laval and Darlan wished to make the Marshal accept. But his role was that of a counsellor and it was evident to us that he would never go so far as to rebel, at the most, he would manifest his disapproval by resigning or retiring.

Moreover a secession would only have been possible if it had been supported from abroad by a considerable quantity of material and perhaps men which was evidently not the case at the time when Weygand was recalled.

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In regard to the resumption of the same policy towards North Africa, one must judge the men who succeeded Weygand in the light of this past.

Whatever their private feelings may be, they are the servants of the State and have accepted its discipline. The most one can expect from the best amongst them is an attitude of correct neutrality and friendly comprehension until the day when an outside event will face them with a new and acute problem.

Having stated these principles, we believe that there is a policy to be followed in North Africa but one must not expect miracles from it for the moment. However it is likely to prepare a favorable terrain for future actions.

...of the military leaders are concerned, we cannot believe that great hopes should be based on them.

General Juin, who commands in Morocco, was a prisoner of the Germans and was freed after promising never again to take up arms against Germany or undertake anything against her which other French officers refused to do.

He was sent to Morocco after Weygand was recalled and it appears probable that his nomination, made by Darlan, was agreeable to the Germans.

We think that General Koeltz (or Coels) who is at the head of the Algerian troops, is the same General who was sent by Weygand to Algeria in June 1940 to determine the technical possibilities for the resistance proposed by General Nogues. He brought back an entirely unfavorable opinion to the Ministers' Council which was used to impose the Armistice.

We had the impression that this mission was not so much to really study the military situation but rather to find arguments to overcome the opposition to capitulation.

We do not wish to draw any conclusion from these memories as to General Koeltz own feelings. However we were not surprised when we were assured that this officer in Algeria, was considered to be in favor of collaboration with Germany.

General de Lattre de Tassigny, commander of the troops in Tunisia, at the beginning of the war was Chief of Staff to General Bourret, commander of the Fifth Army on the Rhine front. General Bourret, former Chief of the Military Cabinet and a personal friend of Daladier, was a republican officer who came up from the ranks. To what extent did his Chief of Staff share his ideas? We could not say.

had a favorable reputation. It seems to us, according to personal information together with these memories, that General de Laitre de Lamoignon perhaps deserves more attention than his two colleagues in Algeria and Morocco from the American authorities.

The successor to General Odis, who joined the 4th Army in movement after having commanded the aviation of all North Africa for a year, is a General who on his arrival in Algeria did not hesitate to criticize General Weygand's attitude, not sufficiently orthodox in his eyes. He has been described to us as an ardent supporter of the regime and of the policy of the extremists.

As for General Harcourt, whose name has been mentioned in connection with North Africa, has been retired and has left Algeria to direct civil aviation at Vichy.

There remains a military personage in Algiers whose role is vague but doubtless of some importance; Admiral Fenard who was brought by General Weygand as his secretary general and who has remained at his post even after the General's departure. He is an adherent of the regime and more of a bureaucrat than a politician.

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It seems to me that the civil administration leaders, although far out of the line and of military origins are much less ardent, more cool-headed, and are in closer contact with the inhabitants and with the realities of daily life.

Admiral Esteva, Resident General at Tunis, is considered in the navy as an outspoken man who has no sympathy for the Germans or the Italians. He is certainly loyal to Marshal Petain, but it is believed in general that he does not adhere to the policy of submission.

The Governor General of Algeria, Yves Chatel, is a distinguished official who was completely successful in Indo-China. He came to Algeria as General Weygand's civilian collaborator and fully satisfied the population by his administrative qualities.

When General Weygand was made Governor General of Algeria, relieving Admiral Abrial, Yves Chatel was his assistant and already assured the management of the civilian administration. After Weygand was recalled, Chatel's actual position was only confirmed when he was officially designated the post of Governor General.

In his case, one seems to be dealing with a man who symbolizes the good French official of which France must have many today: they are people who are more concerned with their country and their duties than with one political regime or another, and who have continued to serve France after the Armistice in the same spirit of devotion as before. Quite certainly they think about recent events and do so intelligently most of the time. They approve neither of the excessive internal measures of the militant superiors of the regime, nor of the questionable actions of the colla-

to the prestige and integrity of Marshal Petain is whom they have confidence. One must not hope that they will rebel against their chiefs but one can be certain that they will make every effort to maintain, as far as they are able, the independence of their country and preserve American friendship for France. Therefore, there certainly is a policy which should be used in regard to such men.

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General Nogues to whom a part of these preceding general observations could be applied, is nevertheless a slightly more complicated case.

Nogues is a very distinguished soldier. For a long time he has also been an extremely diplomatic high official. Through his family connections and social habits he is also something of a politician. His wife, who has great influence over him and has a great many outside activities, is the daughter of the former Foreign Minister Delcassé who played an important role in European politics at the beginning of the century.

One should not lose sight of the fact - and we hope that M. and Mme Nogues will do the same - that the most important action of Delcassé's career was the cordial Franco-British entente. Nogues has administered Morocco with a certain amount of success since 1935, besides which he has been Commander in Chief of French North African forces since 1939. In this position he had worked to increase the strength of the African Army. In spite of the scarcity of modern material, owing to insufficient industrial means, he had established a solid instrument of war which it would have been possible to plan to

Unfortunately the contrary took place, beginning on May 10 the Commandant emptied North Africa of her best soldiers and modern material.

Nevertheless General Nogues in strong terms proposed to the Government that they seek refuge in Algeria where he was preparing to defend himself. It was at that time that General Weygand sent General Koeltz, as we have already told, to establish the technical impossibility of the proposed resistance.

General Nogues bowed to the armistice decision but not without having very nobly protested. He was even threatened with disgrace because of the vigour of his telegram to General Weygand and it was with great difficulty that President Lebrun and M. Camille Chautemps were able to defend him.

Sometime later we had the opportunity to question him about these events. Was it simply a chance of technical conviction or professional discipline? He did not hesitate to tell us that he had been misinformed at the time of his appeal for resistance, that at that time he did not believe the defeat at home to have been such a catastrophe and therefore that there would be time to transport fresh troops and material to Africa. He added that since the facts were better known, he believed the decision not to attempt a hopeless struggle in Africa was wise. According to him a German attack, preceded by a landing, even by air, in Spanish Morocco would have found French Africa so little prepared for modern war that the destruction and conquest of our beautiful colony would have been certain and rapid.

We recently ascertained that this was likewise the opinion of an other officer of great merit and in his case can not be accused of any partiality towards Vichy, since he has gone to join General de Gaulle. We are speaking of General Odio who was in command of aviation in North Africa.

This is a point which we would especially like to bring to the attention of the American Government. The question of responsibilities in regard to the Armistice, which according to some can have no other explanation but treason, is poisoning the atmosphere. Even recently W. Churchill in his Ottawa speech declared that if the French had gone to Africa, Italy would have been liquidated in 1940. It is on this assertion that he principally bases his indiscriminate accusation of "the men of Bordeaux". This is a technical point which we ask the American Government to study. According to us this conclusion, derived from the facts has not been proved and springs from irritation rather than reflection. Doubtless one could have conceived a plan - and the High Command and the Prime Minister are guilty of not having studied the possibilities - for a prepared general retreat towards Algeria in case of a metropolitan defeat. But the men and available material should have been sent in time. We do know that this was not the case for Reynaud on the eve of his resignation, was still considering with de Gaulle what they called the "reduit breton" (retreat in Brittany) without even having referred to the Commander-in-Chief. Therefore there could not have been any important counter-offensive of arms in North Africa. The English, after

inspired, did not have at their disposal any material which could have been sent to the French and America had just answered that she could do nothing.

Under these conditions the British Prime Minister's assurance is not based on serious proofs. One could just as well maintain that the Armistice, without collaboration, would not have placed the Allies in a worse situation than would have resulted from the total occupation of France with 2 million more prisoners, the naval bases, like Toulon and doubtless all the French African bases, in the hands of the enemy.

To return to General Nogues, in the past he had a good attitude, later he submitted to the new regime. In August 1940 he seemed to us somewhat timorous with regard to government authority. Nevertheless, we believe that his inner feelings must have remained the same, and we can not consider him either as an enemy of England or America or as a friend of Germany.

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In our opinion, one should seek the support of the more modest but more independent agents rather than rely on the great leaders. In North Africa there are legions of officials of medium rank who have influence on both the French and native populations and who ask nothing better than to work for the liberation of their country.

It is necessary to create, with the support of those who can be approached - and by going from one to the other one will find a great number - an atmosphere

towards the Germans and Italians; and towards those who wish to submit to them and develop a hopeful and expectant spirit in the population. The leaders will feel it and will themselves be more confident, - or more prudent.

When the day comes and the need is felt, one will find a population prepared to do their duty towards their country and towards their liberators.

File
Africa op/row
By
Jacques de Shelley

FOREIGN NATIONALITIES
BRANCH

FOREIGN NATIONALITIES
BRANCH

845

EVENTUAL ACTION ON THE PART OF
NORTH AFRICA IN THE CONFLICT

No action in North Africa could be or even should be dictated from here. It should be done from North Africa.

As was indicated in the other report, such action should come particularly from the Sahara, beyond the frontier, south of Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, and possibly from Egypt.

When the necessary arrangements have been made in North Africa, then that action could be directed from any locality desired.

We can already be, and from now on remain, sure of the major opinion among the North African population. Still we must not lose sight of the fact that that population cannot, in anything, concerning its feelings and its reactions, be compared to any people in Europe.

Feelings of the North African population in regard to the various belligerents

In regard to Italy:

Other European countries had invaded the Arabian countries. But the Italo-Tripolitanian war was the most

-2- (Active in North Africa)

recent. The generations of Arabs who had seen it still lived at a time when, before dying, they could narrate its catastrophes to the generations still living. Southern Tunisia especially was occupied by Tripolitanian refugees, for whom the North African people, because of their religious ties, felt great sympathy. That Italo-Tripolitanian war had already left among the North African people a certain rancour in regard to Italy.

Sicily is not far from Tunisia. Few of the truly sensible and lyrical Italian people arrived in North Africa. Those who came were mostly Sicilians, rather unpolished and without much culture. In general they arrived looking like paupers, sometimes barefooted, and they could come in at night, clandestinely, on fishing boats. The appearance of these people did not speak much in their favor, and the pejorative impression which they made on the Arabs was applied automatically to the whole Italian nation.

The Arab likes the moderate gesture and the deep sentiment. Those southern Italians are on the contrary expansive in their gestures and rather demonstrative in their enthusiasm. Such demonstrations were translated by the Arab as arrogance, and there was perhaps a little

-1- (Act) in North Africa)

of that. The general attitude of these Italians irritated the North African population.

Even long before 1930, Fascist organizations had been founded in North Africa, principally in Tunisia: economic and political Fascist groups, Fascist meeting halls, Fascist theaters, Fascist sports groups, and so forth. Those organizations took in a large majority of young people, who were evidently even more demonstrative than their elders. Tunisia everywhere took on the aspect of a country already invaded.

The Italian Fascist regime was not ignorant of the advantages which Arabian friendship could assure for them. All endeavors tending to establish that friendship were attempted. The broadcasting station at Bari (Italy) broadcast regular transmissions for the Arabic world. But their success remained relative. Finally, Mussolini essayed a personal effort, thereby committing a serious error which proved a total lack of psychology and of tact. He proclaimed himself the defender of Islam, and, having brought together some Tripolitanian notables under the pay of the Fascist regime -- notables who assuredly understood nothing of the ceremony, or if they did

1- (Article on North Africa)

could do nothing but execute the orders given them -- Mussolini had himself offered a sword which he consecrated the "Sword of Islam". The effect, on the Arabs, was as one can imagine, exactly the opposite of that he had intended.

The Fascist attack on Ethiopia still more aggravated the feelings of the Arabs. There were some movements in favor of it. The Arabs even demanded military action against Italy.

Then there were useless and somewhat vainglorious demonstrations, in the newspapers and on the screen, of Ciano, of the sons of Mussolini, of Mussolini, and of the whole Italian Fascist movement. These demonstrations pleased no country. They pleased North Africa even less.

The Italian demands on Tunisia, announced before the war, brought the resentment of the North African people to a climax.

This resentment still exists today and is certainly not close to disappearing.

4- (Action in North Africa)

In regard to Germany:

As we have seen in the other report, France, though not finding the necessary economic relief in North Africa, could not be accused of ill feelings or lack of good will. However, the situation was latent, and its effects did not fail to return to the minds of the North African population at every occasion. The last war had cost North Africa 300,000 men. These men had not fallen for a cause which was of interest only to one or a few distinct countries, but for the cause of universal democracy. However, the North African people did not go so far: they simply could not see any intrinsic compensation in return for such a sacrifice. In North Africa a part of the population, especially the educated, has formed an opinion, right or wrong. The other part of the population is neutral or supports more or less the opinion of the first. After such a loss, which they considered unjust and useless, the first part revised, so to speak, their feelings. They did not become Germanophiles or Francophobes, but their own nationality got the upper hand again, without their being necessarily either for or against the one,

(Action in North Africa)

or for or against the others. The influence of these elements in their own spheres is by no means negligible. We should hope that today the peril of the totalitarian regimes does not escape them. But we must also anticipate the worst. That is why it will be necessary, to contact these people quickly, to verify their feelings and their activity, correcting them if need be.

The Jewish-Arabic rivalries in Palestine, no doubt lacking in the years 1935 and 1936, had inevitably had some repercussions in certain North African centres. Even at that time, sympathies in favour of the German National-Socialistic regime and its chiefs, the champions of anti-Semitism, had been strong. Certain shops even had portraits of Hitler hung on the wall beside that of Mustapha Kemal. It is true that these shops were a little off the main thoroughfares. But they existed. The gravity of the situation between France and Germany which preceded the war, and especially the war itself, should have put an end to such exuberance. But today, when such a consideration is no longer necessary, and especially with the present collaboration of the Franco-German element, we must

7. Conquest in North Africa

anticipate the return of these manifestations. If they exist, it will be necessary to try to convert their originators, if not to fight them.

The conquests did not last. Frequently, even, they vanished with the disappearance of those who had achieved them, if not before. The Mussulman armies had associated military conquest with the conquest of the spirit by conversion. The son of a conquered person revolts against his invader and tries to shake off his yoke. The son of a convert becomes more conquered than his father. From Morocco to Asia, the greater part of those who compose the Mussulman populations, in reality, conquered. These people do not know it. Or if they know it, they do not resent it. Better still, these people are the first army of their conqueror.

With the same ends of conquest in mind, National Socialism also wants to associate its military action with a doctrine aiming at the conquest of the spirit. By several details, it could even be established as having sought its inspiration in Islam.

On the other hand, as another consequence of the Islamic military method, these Mussulman populations of

The Muslim in North Africa

Today have perhaps different nationalities, but the value of these nationalities is in name only. Besides the religious bond, there is a national bond, uniting these populations. They stand together, in the spirit and the form of Islam, they are but a single nation. Among other things, an Algerian, for example, who might go into another Arabized country, would find himself automatically placed under the protection of the government or of the army of the country. For as long as he might wish to stay in that country, he is in the country.

Happily, at the time when we were in power, about 1954 and 1956, we had a North African policy. We talked with the Nationalist Movement in the Algerian Sahara and with the Nationalist Movement in the Sahara. We did not enter into any agreement between the Algerian and the Saharan. On the contrary, the Algerian movement had the upper hand, and the Nationalist Movement in the Sahara, in spite of everything, the word is "infatigable". But every propaganda can even in the future take a notion to establish a liaison. In that case, it must especially exploit the advantages which Islam can offer. It has

2. (Action in North Africa)

Furthermore begun to establish that liaison, with the peoples of Iran and Arabia. But so far this has been done very confusedly and awkwardly. You have probably seen in recent press articles that German propaganda is now trying to feed to these populations the thesis that the German chief is descended from the prophet. It will soon be necessary to take some counter-measures not only in North Africa but in the entire Arabian world.

Enemy propaganda likewise tries to take advantage of the release of North African prisoners of war, especially by circulating the word in North Africa that the latter could not find its liberation except with a victory of the Axis. Some suggestions for arguments of that kind are condensed in the other report. We do not see anything inconvenient in substantially taking them up again. It will be necessary to remind the North Africans, and to instruct those among them who do not know it -- these are not lacking -- that the Axis powers are poor and over-populated. They are seeking expansion for themselves. Further, the totalitarian regime does not conceive of the right for free competition. It aims at

10- (Action in North Africa)

the mastery of world economy, and, following the same order of ideas, has evinced this by demanding everything which can primarily serve its own interests, without consideration for the consequences to others. Such a promise of liberation, on the other hand, cannot be anything but deceitful and can only serve its own ends in the conflict. However, it will not be astonishing that many North Africans would let themselves be taken in by that promise, and they should be warned immediately. All the North Africans should also be instructed that the economic difficulties of North Africa, essentially an agricultural country, arose from the fact that she was dealing with a mother-country essentially agricultural like herself, rather than one essentially industrial, which would have permitted the establishment of a beneficial economic exchange between her and the mother-country. France, on her side, seeing no solution to the problem, did not know how to exploit the wealth and resources of her North African possession other than by sending her surplus of officials and of candidates for all sorts of jobs, which made North African economy still worse. As for Italy, it is even less industrial

II. (Axis) in North Africa)

and less rich than France. If North Africa or Tunisia passed under Italy's domination, their economy would be ruined completely, and these countries would suffer from an influx of Italians even greater than that of Frenchmen. Germany makes even greater attempts at expansion than Italy. If North Africa, or a part of it, passed under German domination, it would be totally over-run by Germans and its population entirely annihilated.

Unlike the Axis powers, the Allies are rich and not lacking in space. Just consider the size of the Great America and its immense riches; just think of the considerable resources at the disposal of England. The liberation of North Africa cannot come except with the victory of the Allies. That victory will immediately establish a current of economic exchange between North Africa, on the one hand, and America and England on the other. It will establish also a direct contact between North Africa and the world. That will mean the impetus to North African economy, and finally the return of prosperity for Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. All the people of North Africa should be made to see these aims developed.

-11- (Att. in North Africa)

Interlude to Japan:

The attack of the Japanese against China, and especially their raids against the Chinese population, helpless to defend themselves, had, as everywhere, and like the Italian Fascist attacks of the same kind on the Ethiopians, aroused the indignation of the North Africans. The cause of the harassment and decimated Chinese people was their own. Nevertheless, the Japanese question in North Africa entailed another matter too.

The latent progress of the Arabians in the field of physics and chemistry -- where, by the way, they used to excel, and which was to a large extent the cause of their stagnant state of today --- is in sharp contrast with that incessant progress of the western world. That is why the sudden and rapid industrial progress of the Japanese took, in the mind of most North Africans, especially among the educated class, the form of a revenge for them on the western world.

The existence today of such feelings in North Africa would be dangerous. At the bottom of their thoughts, and without doubt unconsciously, these North

32- (AM) In North Africa)

Africans were certainly headed towards regarding the Japanese as in some way following the interrupted work of Islam, or at least pursuing an analogous work. If enemy propaganda were to take hold of the argument, it could aggrandize it at will, and unhesitatingly present to the Arabs the Japanese as their benefactors. Furthermore, the Arabs and the Japanese have some similarities: fanaticism, love of weapons, and, most important of all, devotion for a military work coupled with a divine work, or vice-versa. It will be necessary, therefore, to forestall such a danger.

This will not be difficult to accomplish. The Arabs should be made to understand that they have absolutely nothing in common with the Japanese -- from the racial point of view -- this point will have to be developed delicately in order not to hurt the Chinese -- or from a national point of view, or from the religious point of view. The Japanese are acting at present exclusively for their own cause. Their actions and their attitude in the countries with a predominantly Mohammedan population, for example in Korea, have furnished sufficient proof of that. A certain

14- (Action in North Africa)

Development from the religious point of view should also be sanctioned, but still delicately -- through a conference this time not only for the Chinese, but for the Hindu populations of non-Mohammedan religion.

And finally it will be necessary to recall from their error, if such there are, those who think that Japan is going to win the war. The propagation of such an argument by the enemy would not be surprising. It will be necessary in this case to explain, insofar as is possible, that is to say without risk of leakage to the military tactics of the Allies, the progress of the war and the fatal defeat of Japan.

In regard to England:

One mistake which England committed was when she pays for dearly today is having failed to undertake an action of spiritual union between her and the Arabian populations, as well as others under her administration. England should absolutely have made herself better known to them and, also, have emphasized the economic advantages which she brought them. To those who knew her but little, England seemed a sterile and distant colonizer, which was a wrong impression, her timidity being the real

-13- (Action in North Africa)

reason for this effect. To those who overlooked the economic question, she did not seem to offer any advantage.

It was, if one remembers it, a period when the opposition among the Arab populations, in regard to England, had taken a rather acute form. The dissensions between the Wafdists and the non-Wafdists in Egypt; the emancipation of the latter; the dissidence of certain groups in Arabia (Hejaz, Iraq, Palestine, and even Yemen); the position taken for and against different Muftis; the Jewish-Arabian-Palestine problem; the dissidence of certain Mohammedan groups in India, which was generally rather contrary to the traditions of the Mohammedan-Hindus, in contrast to the feelings of the Hindus of other beliefs, loyal to England; all these incidents, moreover, have taken or have continued to take place during and before this period. Newspapers in the Arabian language, of the several countries in countries mentioned, were circulating; then in North Africa and propagating the same erroneous sentiments in regard to England. It is not to be doubted that enemy propaganda

-16- (Arabs in North Africa)

today exports the same arguments. It would be rather surprising if it extended the prejudice which these arguments can carry even to the American people, since they and the English people have numerous affinities, especially in language.

Fortunately, if the Arab has a false opinion he generally has it less through personal error or lack of good sense than through ignorance or poor information. It suffices to show him that he is in error in order that he will immediately correct himself. He should, therefore, not neglect to act effectively in this matter.

In regard to Vichy:

Now and then there is occasion for us to hope that the true intentions of Vichy are favorable and that they will be disclosed at some opportune time. American and British policy has often had that same hope in a certain compromise. This sometimes difficult attitude of the Allies is especially motivated by the preponderant role which North Africa could play in the conflict, owing to the prime importance of its strategic worth, and owing to its position behind the operations in Libya and the

(V. Nothing in North Africa)

possessed in the form of a large part of the French fleet. In disposing of North Africa the Allies would see their liberty of action greatly increased.

If the intentions of Vichy were really honest, Vichy would welcome the work which the Allies would accomplish in North Africa. The question does not concern Free France. Her feelings are definite and known.

Today the North African population is entirely at the mercy of the influence of Vichy and of enemy propaganda. Furthermore -- it is what took place, at least, before the war, and there is every reason to believe that things have not changed, on the contrary -- the Sultan of Morocco and the Bey of Tunis do not receive their subsidies directly from the budget of their countries. They must await them from Vichy. All those manifestations of loyalty for Vichy in North Africa, which the newscasts show or which the press reports, mean, in reality, absolutely nothing.

If the intentions of Vichy were doubtful, and if opposition on her part were exercised in North Africa, it would be very easy to win the sentiment of the North African population. It would even be easy to study

118. (Action in North Africa)

certain overtures to the Sultan and the Bey.

In regard to America:

Certain of the factors which acted in North Africa in favor of the American people might perhaps seem like anodynes. Their effect was considerable. There were "cowboy films" and films of the American-Mexican frontier (youth, grown up, lost none of its sympathies); American films in general; American industrial products, generally unbeatable in quality and in price, with, in the first rank, automobiles; the privilege, among so many others in the United States, of possessing champions like Dempsey, Tunney, etc.; American sporting manifestations; American sailors, with their open, pleasing faces. All these factors together, probably even beyond the estimates of the American authorities, if not without their knowledge, contributed remarkably to the development of a deep and quite justifiable sympathy for the American people, a sympathy moreover which certainly exists in several other countries. Anything American had a magic effect on the North African population.

Out of regard for their traditions, it was perhaps

(Action in North Africa)

difficult for the United States to supplant a foreign power, especially when that power was France. They could not exploit that North African sympathy beyond its natural spontaneity.

But after the Armistice, in June, 1940, such an effort was not only possible, it was necessary. It would first of all have spared North Africa from falling into the service and perhaps even into the hands of the enemy. North Africa would have been preserved for the advantage of the Allies. If at that time an efficient contact had been established between North Africa and the United States, the latter would have been assured of the absolute support of North Africa. That support would have been for an immediate or subsequent action.

Today nothing is yet lost. Actions of separate groups can take place rapidly. These groups can attain all the desired objectives and lend all the aid which one might expect from them.

A favorable public opinion will facilitate that action of the groups and encourage it. It will keep it, above all, within the democratic spirit.

(Attaching to North Africa)

Besides all the known advantages offered by North Africa, there is also the valor of the Arabian soldier. Certainly he would require an allied plan to direct his immediate military action and to restore him later, after the conflict, to a peaceful and productive activity. But his help would be very precious. Of a simple nature, and furthermore, not having been informed of the true causes for which he fought, he unfortunately served, in Spain, against the democratic cause, against his own interests. But it would not be too much to say that he has contributed largely to Franco's victory. Appropriate efforts in regard to the North African population would certainly lead to the formation of an important Arabian corps. The same efforts would succeed in winning the support of the entire Arabian and Mohammedan world.

*File
Office of*

DIRECTIVE FOR COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
Re Operations in French North Africa

DEFINITION

1. French North Africa, for purposes of this directive, is defined as those parts of French Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia lying north of 30° N. Latitude.

OBJECTIVES

The objectives for the operations of the Office of Strategic Services in French North Africa are:

- a. To maintain friendly relations with the French in North Africa in order:
 1. To obtain French cooperation in case of possible military operations.
 2. To minimize French collaboration with the Axis.
 3. To further French resistance by means of subversive activities and guerilla warfare in case of Axis occupation.
- b. To maintain our information agencies in North Africa.
- c. To obtain definite information on the amount of economic help that French North Africa is rendering to the Axis.

METHODS OF ACCOMPLISHMENT

The Office of Strategic Services may guarantee economic assistance in the maximum amount practicable for these objectives as determined by the Board of Economic Warfare.

SECRET

4. The OSS may guarantee such arms, equipment and

munitions for guerilla warfare and subversive activities as the OSS may obtain from the British, such arms equipment and munitions to be held in such places as the OSS and the British may determine, until actual aggressive action by the Axis warrants its distribution.

OTHER COMMITMENTS

No other commitments will be made by the Coordinator of Information unless directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

*File Africa
of Plans*

*Office North Africa
x Operation, Unit
x Algeria
x J.C.*

November 7, 1942

Brigadier General John R. Deane
Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff
Public Health Building
Washington, D.C.

My dear General Deane:

I have already talked with you about the necessity of setting up an operation unit in Algeria for penetration of the Continent from there. The British are desirous of joining with us. I have written General Smith and he wants to be advised of the plans.

It is our purpose to place Colonel Idey in charge of all our units in that area for that work.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

ST. AVENUE VICTOR HUGO

Accelerate, also heavy shoes, put them on.
 Reheated coat with flannel lining.
 Blankets or cotton flannel sleeping bags.
 Sun glasses useful, gloves in winter.
 (for 80% traffic)

Chlorine or other treatment for water.
 Can get beer and wine.

Can get mutton, some beef, chickens,
 eggs, little fish, few vegetables,
 or fruit until later in season, no
 butter or flour.

Must buy gasoline, oil & coal in quantities.
 Take scrapers, rollers, shovels, picks
 and metal equipment for airfields, and
 drilling equipment for cleaning wells.

200000 flashlights & 600000
 batteries - for use for 300000
 Railroad flares, signal spires, etc.

AVENUE VICTOR HUGO

Plaster, cloth, heavy shoes, etc.
 Packages sent with thermal car and
 blankets or water for fire etc.
 Sun-goggles useful, gloves in
 (for 80% top)

Obtain other treatments for
 Can get beer and wines.

Can get mutton, some beef, etc.
 eggs, little fish, few vegetables
 or fruit until later in season.
 Butter or flour.

Plant to go to blue, oil + coal in area.

Take Terapens, rollers slowly, piece
 and the total requirements for aircraft
 or cheap equipment for blessing and

200,000 flashlight bulbs + 600,000

batteries - fountain pen sign co

Railroad fluorescent spools / 9 lines per

in villages, etc.

All Arab villages to be "not
found" except for U.N. stations.
All Arab churches, mosques &
warehouses (usually with a
white domed roof) to be kept
clear of explosives by U.N. or
in vicinity.

But in President's proclamation
"I do not desire to interfere in
any way in native customs or
life, customs or people. I
interfere ~~not~~ with the
of natives of what ever ^{kind of} ~~sort~~
their beliefs or (tribes)
can possibly be ascertained. I have

These few instructions may
 military commands to
 entering Moroccan
 from ~~the~~ villages, mosques and
 other sacred places. Maintain
 treaty relations unchanged
 since 1836. (checked 1836)
 proclamations etc. French + int.
 of French friendly and or neutral
 immediately, active French
 flag to be flown along with U.S.
 no case touch or handle
 Moroccan flag (store and the
 ground) of
 Buy cotton goods as much as possible
 5 gross American / Caps / stockings for
 for guides
 other party or present local
 collect his ~~brother~~ ~~and~~ ~~other~~ ~~family~~ ~~also~~

1. General
 2. Police
 3. Fire
 4. Health
 5. Education
 6. Religion
 7. Industry
 8. Commerce
 9. Transportation
 10. Public Works
 11. Amusement
 12. Art
 13. Science
 14. History
 15. Geography
 16. Botany
 17. Zoology
 18. Astronomy
 19. Mathematics
 20. Logic
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 22. Law
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Uniform

Winter, cloth, heavy shoes, puttees, rubberized coat with flannel lining. Blankets or waterproofed sleeping bags. Sun glasses useful, gloves unnecessary (for 80% troops).

Chlorine or other treatment for water. Can get beer and wines.

Can get mutton, some beef, chicken eggs, little fish, few vegetables or fruit. Until later in season, no butter or flour.

Must bring gasoline, oil and coal in quantity. Take scrapers, rollers, shovels, picks and metal equipment for airfields and drilling equipment for cleaning wells.

Two hundred thousand flashlights and six hundred thousand batteries, fountain pen like convenient. Railroad flares (metal spikes) green.

Occupy all military and naval establishments, workshops, garages, hospitals (but no native hospitals).

Gasoline storage (see my list for all companies, capacities, cities, ship and rail connections. France auto and auto hall and their warehouses. Take first all radio stations and cable station (Casa), then Post officers (for telephone circuits) newspaper and printing offices, censorship offices.

Hotels:

Agadir, Terminus & Marabo
Safi, Marabo
Casa, Aufa Saferin (Servass)
Plaza, Transatlantique
Excelsior, Majestic

-2-

Fedala, Camino Hotel (Servass)
Rabat Ballina
Tez Palais Jamaïque

Have civil administrators live with "controleurs civils"

All Arab villages to be "out of bounds" except for M.P. on duty. All Arab churches, Mosques and Marabouts (usually white stone with domes roof) to be kept clear of even M.P., inside or in vicinity.

Put in President's proclamation "I do not desire to intrude in any way in native Moroccan customs or properties, nor interfere with the lives of natives, tribes or religious beliefs -- if it can possibly be avoided. I have therefore instructed my military commanders to refrain from entering Moroccan villages, Mosques and other sacred places." Mention treaty relations unchanged since 1836 (check date with State) Proclamations, etc in French and Arabic on same sheet. If French friendly and/or surrounded, immediately raise French flag to be flown along side U.S. In no case touch or hand down Moroccan flag (Star on red background). Buy cotton goods as soon as possible for sale to Arabs.

Five gross American flags (stamps or bonds if feasible) Dollar parity on present local price levels and fix maximum prices pro rata. Contact Ist Michelier, Inc, Sultan, Army, Air Force.

Secret

MILITARY TRIBUNALS

October 8, 1942

Comments and suggestions by Mr. Culbert:

Page 2 Art. 2e. Why British procedure?

- " 3 " 4 American civilians and protoges should there-
fore still be tried before Consular Courts.
Who tries British subjects?
- " 5 " 4 Believe Arabs should be tried only before
courts at which there is present a represent-
ative of local Moroccan authority, viz. Sultan,
Pascha, Caid Sheik, etc., whose function is
that of observer and if desired by court, of
adviser to court.
- " 6 " 7(a)(2) 2 years' hard labor is no wise proportionate
to 50,000 francs today in Morocco. 500,000
francs would be nearer.
- " 6 " 7(a)(3) Bump up 5,000 to 50,000 francs.
- " 6 " 7(b)(1) Expulsion to where?
- " 6 " 7(b)(3) Close house for fixed time, but also pro-
hibit operator from running similar business
in another place during same time.
- " 8 " 10(2)b. Fine of 250,000 francs much too low. Sug-
gest 2,000,000.

JTC.

(11D)

Secret

PROCLAMATION (FRIENDLY)

October 8, 1942

Comments and suggestions by Mr. Culbert:

Page 1 Par. 2 Strike out 3 last words. The Arabs, better referred to as the Moroccans, would not elect a French government. Add in somewhere, possibly before 1st sentence, 3d paragraph, "Neither we nor our Allies intend to annex or otherwise permanently control your territory."

Comments on Ordinance accompanying above Proclamation.

Page 1 Art. 2 Add "within the occupied zone."

" 2 " 10 Cut out. None function now.

" 5. After Article 14 should come similarly-phrased article covering public radio broadcasting as a guide to its censorship. It is understood that ultimately we will take over completely such programs.

" 5. " 16(a) Add at end "In no case should such prices exceed those already authorized."

Fre.

Secret.

(LIIID)

PROCLAMATION

(HOSTILE)

October 9, 1942

Comments and suggestions by Mr. Culbert:

Page 2 1st para. 5th line. Omit "counties" as non-existent.

" 2 1st para. 9th line. Omit "street railways" as above.

Add in this paragraph that Priests and other religious leaders, school administrators and teachers should likewise continue to function. (In France, school professors, etc., are government employees; in French Colonies, priests, etc., are subsidized by the government and classed as French government employees -- "fonctionnaires")

Ordinances on Proclamation (Hostile)

Page 2 Art. 5 Add "He will be allowed to carry such firearms or ammunition only after he shall have obtained a permit through local police officials signed or stamped by military authority."

" 3 " 11(A) 4th line. After "forces" add "ships or aircraft."

" 4 " 11(d) Add after first sentence, "but not with another city or exchange, even though the connection be automatic." N.B. Rabat and Casablanca calls are now available from either place through automatic telephones.

FR.

Secret

Page 4 Art. 11(b) Restriction against radio transmitters is not strong enough. Require handing over with 48 hrs and specify failure to do so punishable by death penalty.

" 5 " 11(g) I do not like the idea of suspension of newspapers even "until censorship is established." Recommend instructions to maintain all newspapers, etc., personnel at their posts and obligate them to continue publication without interruption but requiring the first pull or trial copy to be submitted immediately to military authority for censorship.

" 6 " 11(e) Penalty not strong enough. Commanding General should be allowed to requisition offending paper etc. and force publication of properly censored editions under his own auspices if necessary. I classify newspapers as a military weapon in this type of war in such territories.

" 7 " 12(a) Not strong enough. Ban all photographs of a military nature and require a permit for all others.

" 7 " 13(a) Broaden this out by adding after "manufacture" the words "or production". This must cover

JR

Secret

vegetable fibre, for instance, which is large element of present farm products today in Morocco and shipped to Germany for manufacture there of explosives. Cobalt, Antimony and Molybdenum are minerals equally desired for war manufacture. Subsequent sub-articles should be modified accordingly.

Page 8 Art. 14(a) Add at end "In no case shall such prices exceed those already authorized."

Fire arms, etc. See remarks above, also remarks on corresponding --

- " 11 Art. 16.(5)(b) Are automobiles and trucks included in "supplies"?
- " 12 " 16.(5)(c)(1a) 3rd line "c" an error? Should reference be to "b" ?
- " 12 " 16.(5)(c)(1c) Substitute for "mayor" "Contrôleur Civil" (Civil Controller). Add to this paragraph, "whether the owner or only the possessor of the article in question". Believe purchases should be centralized through one agency in any area and close cooperation exist between different areas to prevent price spreads. Similarly,

JFR

regulations should be controlled possibly
through the Civil Affairs Officers.

Para 10 AM, 120. Out out "mayor" as above.

" 10 " 120. " " " " "

" 14 " 10 This is a dangerous procedure as there are no
elected representatives of the people in present
French government. All that can be done in such
a case (if we wish to avoid the German hostage
system) is to fire the civil controller and put
a good man in his place. He can and he will find
the outlets.

" 14 " 120. (1) This brings up question of "circular courts",
which in my opinion should be discontinued during
a period of martial law--but may well be resumed
as soon as our Civil Affairs officers have taken
over control. They apply only to U.S. Nationals
or hostages (Americans protected by U.S. law due
to their business relations with the U.S. The
number of the latter is very limited. Civilian
Nationals (civilians) would and should be subject
to trial by our military courts.

" 14 " 120. (2) Fine too low, Make 100,000,

Secret

Page 18 Art. 19e. (1)(c) Fine too low. Make 50,000.

" 18 " 19e. (2)(c) Add "and that defendant be forbidden from engaging in a similar business during the said period."

" 18 " 19e. (3) Fines too low, although disparity need not be so great here as in case of maximum penalties imposed in (b) and (c) above. For instance, the sentences of hard labor shown in Table are in line, but not the alternative fines. Anybody would find it cheap to purchase a false identity card for 5000 francs, but not for 3 years hard labor. Believe serious reconsideration necessary to properly correlate the two.

Page 21. Table of Penalties. Why no penalties for photographer indoors--which cover photostating of documents, etc.?

" 24 16 (c) relative to 16(a) depends on exchange rate selected.

775

Secret

(IID)

CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION, ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
(Purpose, General Policies, Functions, Etc.)

October 8, 1942

Comments and suggestions by Mr. Culbert:

Page 1 Art. 2(a)(3) Personal and property rights of neutral

citizens respected, subject to military necessity
of requisitioning for military use.

" 2 " 3(a) Why restrict to French North Africa? How about
Spanish?

" 2 " 3(b) Senior General U.S. Officer.

" 3 " 4(b) See remarks, Art. 3(a), above.

" 3 " 5 Are Regional Civil Affairs Officers responsible
to local Regional Military Governors?

" 6 " 11(d) Requisitioning of trucks, cars, housing facil-
ities, food, labor should be responsibility of
Civil Affairs Officer, rather than separate Arms
or Services concerned.

" 9 " 16 Consular courts to be suspended for the period
of the Military occupation.

" 10 " 17 How about other claims? Intentional.

" 10 " 18(b) Inspection of water systems, slaughter houses.

" 10 " 19 (a) Suspension of Economic Accords between Morocco
and other foreign nations (Portugal, Spain).

JRC.

Secret

Page 12 Art. 19(h) Should be centralized and placed as soon
as possible under control of Civil Affairs
Officer's Administration.

" 12 " 20(b) Who is "Naval Commander-in-Chief?"

" 12 " 20(c) Port Commanders, U. S. Naval Officers?

- - - - -

Take over control of all property, including apartments,
leases and/or sales.

785

Notes on Discussion
Present: W J O, Rosen, Taylor,
R. Murphy, Bruce September 6, 1942

It was decided to eliminate any reference to a "second front" in connection with this matter.

Mr. Murphy stated that the initial stage is the critical one; preparations should be made for real force - if it is thought that two divisions are needed, then have five to insure success at the beginning. Once you have successfully passed the initial stage you need little.

Power capable of insuring success must be shown if support within the area is to be gained.

Use two sentences to point up necessity for having psychological warfare preparation - it is nothing but the "softening" process used in any fight conducted by men of skill.

Advantages:

1. Lack of advance preparation would increase security.
2. Lack of an accompanying psychological warfare activity would leave commander free to move without consideration of inhabitants.

-2-

Disadvantages:

1. Lack of preparation makes it impossible to eliminate resistance in advance.
2. Failure to exploit fully known friendship and practical assistance of inhabitants might cause unnecessary resistance.

Colonel Donovan suggested two basic points:

First, going in to have the whole job done internally by the French who are there, who would take over the country and invite us in,

But if that is not feasible, then

Second, setting up as many of these activities as possible and designation of reception committees for us.

The French swear that they will defend themselves against the Germans. This gives us the advantage that if the Germans came in, it would provoke hostilities with the French.

However, if the Germans came into North Africa, our position would not be hopeless, because we could move through

-3-

Dakar.

On the other hand, for the Germans themselves to go into Dakar would take a long time, during which we could move in North Africa.

Even if we tried psychological preparation and thus tipped our hand to the Germans and they came barging in, it would be unfortunate, but we would still have a chance of beating them into Dakar and a series of possibilities in France itself, with the French Fleet, etc.

Mr. Murphy suggested that possibly we should provoke action with the Germans at some point. If the Germans became aware that we were going in and started preparations themselves, we might enlist additional local support.

One way to do it would be to make all military preparations in advance and have a force ready to move - and then effect political penetration, and order your force in at any time.

-4-

Mr. Murphy said the French group might provoke action by the Axis at any given point; but Colonel Donovan would not like to see it; we don't quite know how much they know.

We need a force sufficient to make an initial landing against resistance and also sufficient to hold the ground against any conceivable German attack at this time.

To land an expeditionary force upon the invitation of and after preparation within the area of supporting groups who would be implemented in the seizure of power and who would invite our entry.

To land expeditionary forces without invitation and without control but with the assurance of aid and assistance both in regard to landing and to occupation of certain ports of entry.

To land an expeditionary force without invitation, without advance assistance and against resistance of the French.

-5-

We should set up a preparatory group within the territory:

1. To seize power if possible and to invite the American forces within for their protection;
2. If impossible to seize power, to set up aid and assistance, such as seizure of radio stations, communication centers, ports of entry, etc.

We might point out that all our people there would be taken into protective custody immediately; the forces of the enemy would be on the alert and would seize everyone who had expressed any friendship for us. Under those circumstances you would probably have the active opposition of the French Navy and most of the French Army establishment, whereas properly you could have some preparation.

Colonel Donovan pointed out that if it got out that we were going to land but they did not know where, it would at least start a civil war.

Suppose we aid and assist them and increase econ-

-6-

omic support and then tell them to go ahead; that we will bring other material when they are ready. We give the French funds to handle the Arabs. (They want \$1,000,000 to handle the Arab group in Morocco.) Then, even if nothing in respect of occupation or landing forces happens, we have given evidence of our good faith, and are still in a better position.

No specific preparation long in advance needed for making a permanent policy of support to resistance in North Africa.

We ought to act on the principle on which we are now acting, which is to give them support to resist Axis penetration.

Such a program would automatically serve to prepare the area politically.

Conclusion - That we ought to aim to have the first point accomplished (invitation), but in order to better obtain security for the accomplishment of that we would not state for the time being to our friends and allies what we were going

-7-

to do but would work on the basis of the second point, which is giving resistance in event of Axis invasion and supporting that resistance. Except that we would support them on a scale which means something.

The French flag must continue to fly and it must be understood that the operation is under French auspices - we are only to act as an auxiliary in the matter. It is a French operation. That is the underlying theme.

We cannot commit an act of aggression - it would fly in the face of every statement we have made. Therefore,

1. We cannot commit any act of aggression.
2. We must look to the ultimate moral position we will have.
3. We must consider the friendly attitude of France on the continent.
4. We must consider the self-respect of the people in the area - they must handle it.

-8-

We want them to consider, not that we should prepare an expedition, but will help the French to seize power and ask us in, but if the attempt fails completely we could give up the idea of going into North Africa. However, if the attack succeeds, by the time we are ready or if we are sure it will succeed, we give them the green light and sail in.

This is an internal S. O. operation. It is a matter of psychological warfare.

The outline would be:

Estimate of the situation.

Possible courses of action.

Discussion of the three collectively.

Then discuss each one.

Conclusion.

North Africa

October 2 from Cole

Boyd informed by Christian soldier, who perhaps may be seeking pleasure and profit, that a message from Rome has been decoded by his group. That message is to the effect that American-British attack against North Africa is expected in October. The Italian Commission is to arrange for all to leave by the best means possible. Only the Italian Consul General is to remain. The Saint states that Darlan is due here about October 14.

October 14 from Murphy

Have instructed Rounds, now in Oran, to go to Lisbon and request State Department instruct Legation in Lisbon to provide transportation from Lisbon to London.

October 15

Information from reliable source here confirms that during the past few weeks there has been distinct movement of French Naval forces from French Mediterranean ports to the Atlantic seaboard. Vice Admiral Ielafont is in command of the cruiser fleet and Vice Admiral Ronach is in command of Front de Mer. Both of these officers will be under the orders of Admiral Michelin, who is to be at Casablanca about October 20. The first two officers mentioned are said to be friendly.

October 16

The French Admiralty has been requisitioning a considerable amount of living quarters in the Oran area. A good source attributes this to the impending arrival of a number of destroyers from Toulon. The same source reports that the Provence and the Strassbourg, both battleships, as well as escorting destroyers will leave Mer-El-Kebir early in November. Rumor in Oran that the Darlan with a large portion of the fleet may arrive in North Africa in October.

October 18

Admiral Darlan's son, Alain, has just entered a hospital in Algiers. It is reported that he is suffering from infantile paralysis.

*Africa
of Plan*

September 17, 1942

Brigadier General A. C. Wedemeyer,
Room 2101, Munitions Building,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Wedemeyer:

I am enclosing a copy of a paper which I discussed with General Eisenhower and then took up with his political section. Since they are going to work from this paper, I thought you might want to see it.

Also, while I was there the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent me a cable indicating those portions of my papers on dissimulation and on things to be done which they had approved or disapproved. Have you seen a copy of that cable?

At the request of General Eisenhower, I am having Ed Taylor leave the Psychological Warfare Committee and am sending him over to be available for General Eisenhower in the psychological warfare end. I will replace Taylor with Jim Rogers.

I hope to talk with you soon.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

September 16, 1942

Brigadier General Walter B. Smith,
Chief of Staff,
United States Forces in England,
London, England.

My dear General Smith:

In July, 1942, the French group handed to us a questionnaire, copy of which I send you. Undoubtedly these questions will be put to us either before or after any operation. I have sent a copy of this questionnaire to Admiral Leahy.

I send you also (1) a memorandum dealing with certain of the economic questions that will be raised; (2) a copy of a memorandum which we have received summarizing the armament position in French North Africa; (3) a copy of a memorandum prepared by the French Staff in North Africa, containing a list of materiel needed by the French forces there; and (4) a memorandum on the plan of action prepared by French Staff officers in Africa.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

September 8, 1946

Admiral William D. Leahy,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Admiral Leahy:

I thought that it would most aid your purposes if I enclosed a plan for psychological warfare unit. I hope to take up with General Eisenhower on Thursday.

As you will see, the enclosed paper deals only with that aspect, but there may be material in it that you will find of interest.

I plan to return here Sunday and if I can be of any service, please let me know.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

September 18, 1942

Honorable John J. McCloy
War Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Jack,

I am sending you the attached
memorandum which I discussed with you
and which I have given to Admiral Leahy
and to General Eisenhower.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

File.
Africa
Op. Plans

September 8, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE V. STROM;
CAPTAIN GEORGE C. DYER

FROM WILLIAM J. DONOVAN

I attach a copy of a memorandum sent to today from Colonel Eddy before his departure from London, relative to intelligence material:

I enclose also copy of a memorandum for General Guenther prepared by Colonel Eddy. You will note that it covers many of the items already delivered by me to you. Also enclosed is a copy of my letter to General Smith on this subject.

In regard to Clopet, mentioned in Colonel Eddy's memorandum: He is being sent to London so that in the interests of security his associates in the Office in Tangier will not know that he is coming to Washington. On arrival in London, he will report to our Colonel Guenther, in charge of S. O. operations. He will then talk to the staff who are doing the detailed planning, and work with them over there.

-2-

He will then be sent on here to report to me and I will make him available to General Patton.

You will note the reference in the memorandum to Knox and Culbert. It is desirable that the question of recalling them from leave shall not be the subject of telegrams from the Legation at Tangier to Washington, for the reason of uncertainty in regard to State Department codes. It would be preferable to do it between London and Washington and merely the simple orders be issued in North Africa. I think, too, it would be desirable for both men to stop at London en route.

SECRET

Approved
by [illegible]

September 8, 1942

Admiral William Leahy,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Admiral Leahy:

I am enclosing a copy of memorandum given to General Gruenther by Colonel Eddy on August 30. I have sent a copy of this to the Security Control Officers, but I thought you would want to have the information.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET

August 30, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL CREWSTER:

To confirm our conversation of this morning I have the honor of making the following recommendations:

1. That Frederick P. Culbert, Vice-Consul and Control Officer at Casablanca be brought to London and later to accompany the expedition to Casablanca. Mr. Culbert is a graduate of the Naval Academy, Class 1916, and is thoroughly familiar with the Port of Casablanca, with the nearby coast and ports to the north, and with the leading French officials. For the past year he has been an intelligence officer, serving under the cover of Vice-Consul and Control Officer, checking up on the economic aid program in French North Africa.

2. John Crawford Knox, Captain U. S. Army Reserve, Inactive, now serving as Vice-Consul and Control Officer at Algiers to be brought out as soon as possible to London and later to return with expedition destined for Oran. Captain Knox is a graduate of Saint Cyr, the French West Point, to which he is one of the very few Americans ever admitted, and served for several years as a commissioned officer in the French Army. This background, together with his own resourcefulness, has given him access to French military circles and government officials from whom he has secured most valuable intelligence. I can think of no one who would be more useful as a guide and aide to those who will have the responsibility in Algeria whether civil or military.

3. Captain David W. King, Vice-Consul and Control Officer at Casablanca, to be the principal agent on shore, with duties corresponding to those exercised by Mr. Culbert. Thus the expedition will have one man on shore--each equally qualified for this special service.

4. Leland L. Poulos, formerly captain, U. S. Army, Vice-Consul and Control Officer at Oran, to be the principal agent on shore with duties corresponding to those of Captain Knox. Poulos has been for over a year in Oran where he is in the confidence of the leaders of the French Separatists Movement and works in close cooperation with the British and British secret services in addition to heading up our own OSS in the province of Oran.

2. I would like to nominate for the civil administration of French North Africa, Mr. Robert B. Murphy, Consul of England at Algiers. Mr. Murphy is a close friend of General Layton and of General Mast, enjoys the prestige with the French unequalled by any American in North Africa.

b. In Tunisia I would recommend as regional administrator Mr. Hooker A. Doolittle, American Consul in Tunis, fearless and aggressive of American rights, who has the warm support of the French because he shares their dislike of the Italians and Germans.

c. In accordance with your own suggestion, I should be happy to remain at Tangier to be of similar assistance in French Morocco.

6. I recommend that Carl Clopet, hydrographer and expert on beaches and ports on the Atlantic Coast of Morocco, be brought to London as soon as possible. Clopet is for eight years captain of the salvage tug boat company which operated on the coast of Morocco where it knows every rock and buoy and wreck, as well as being an expert on the very treacherous swell which is perhaps the chief hazard for any landing party. Clopet is now employed in my office in Tangiers and I can arrange to have him sent to London immediately upon my return in the next two or three days.

7. I recommend that a signal plan be arranged, both at Gibraltar and Tangiers, for communication with the approaching convoys by our secret wireless sets in North Africa to transmit last minute information regarding troop movements, Axis or Vichy defense measures and political developments.

8. I recommend that on D-Day, when the landing operations actually begin, I be authorized to arrange for the assassination of the members of the German Armistice Commission at Casablanca and for any members of the German or Italian Armistice Commissions who may then be in the city of Oran. About twenty of the German Army and Navy officers live together in a hotel in Casablanca and the assignments have already been made for this job to men who have the demolition materials already in their hands. I might add that our principal agent in Casablanca is the father of a boy who was shot as a hostage in Paris recently and the father is impatiently awaiting permission to carry out his assignment.

-3-

9. I should like instructions regarding sabotage to be performed on D-Day. Our groups are prepared to destroy key power stations, tunnels, and bridges connecting Morocco with Algeria and they are prepared to isolate from reinforcement the Port of Fedalah and the Port of Lyantey. These preparations were in anticipation of Axis aggression and will presumably not be necessary if we occupy the territory first. However, it could be possible for us to seize and hold the airfields at Oran, Rabat, and Casablanca, if that is your wish. The question also arises whether you wish us to attempt the destruction of the gasoline stores of the French Navy or whether you prefer to gamble on their capture and their usefulness to us. It is, of course, in general, true that we can count upon the submission or active support of the French Army as we must also count upon the determined resistance of the French Navy and of the aircraft under the Navy's control.

RESPECTFULLY,
Yours truly,

W. A. GAY,
Lt. Col., U.S. Marine,
Naval Reserve
TANGIER, MOROCCO.

*File
Africa op plan*

*Office 2
Zet
Lea
Security
SECRET
London*

September 8, 1942

Brigadier General A. C. Wedemeyer,
Room 2101, Munitions Building,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

✓ My dear General Wedemeyer:

Here is a copy of a letter I just received from Colonel Eddy and also a copy of my letter to the Security Control Officers. You will find also the enclosure sent to me by Colonel Eddy which, as you see, was based on a copy of a letter to General Smith, which I turned over also to the Security Control Officers (copy of the latter is also enclosed).

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

SECRET**COPY**

now in this office, that I shall
 London

for you and for the Area Command.

September 2, 1942

You see Colonel Black, I might

MEMORANDUM FROM LT. COL. W. A. EDDY

I told General Gruenther that Colonel Black, G-2 for General Patton, had asked formally for certain routine intelligence data which I had proposed to send to you in Washington to be shared with Colonel Black or anyone else concerned. General Gruenther insisted that this is the wrong procedure, that centralized planning is done by the Area Commander's staff in London, whereas the assignments of anyone Force Commander are subject to change. He instructed me, therefore, to send pertinent data to O.S.S. here in London who will transmit it to G-2 or G-3 of the Area Command, who would, in turn, see that it reaches the person or persons who will use the information. I shall, in the absence of contrary instructions, communicate in the first instance, regarding Gymnast, with Colonel Guenther

-2-

here in this office, whom I shall count on to provide copies for you and for the Area Command. Is this all right? If you see Colonel Black you might explain the situation lest he be expecting to hear from Tangier directly.

SECRET

September 8, 1942

**MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE V. STRONG
CAPTAIN GEORGE C. DYER****FROM WILLIAM J. DONOVAN**

I attach a copy of a memorandum sent to today from Colonel Eddy before his departure from London, relative to intelligence material:

I enclose also copy of a memorandum for General Gruenther prepared by Colonel Eddy. You will note that it covers many of the items already delivered by me to you. Also enclosed is a copy of my letter to General Smith on this subject.

In regard to Clopet, mentioned in Colonel Eddy's memorandum: He is being sent to London so that in the interests of security his associates in the Office in Tangier will not know that he is coming to Washington. On arrival in London, he will report to our Colonel Gruenther, in charge of S. O. operations. He will then talk to the staff who are doing the detailed planning, and work with them over there.

He will then be sent on here to report to me and I will make him available to General Patton.

You will note the reference in the memorandum to Knox and Culbert. It is desirable that the question of recalling them from leave shall not be the subject of telegrams from the Legation at Tangier to Washington, for the reason of uncertainty in regard to State Department cover. It would be preferable to do it between London and Washington and merely the simple orders be issued in North Africa. I think, too, it would be desirable for both men to stop at London en route.

SECRET

August 27, 1942

Brigadier General Walter B. Smith,
The Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Smith:

I am enclosing a memorandum which undertakes to show those things which both "outside and inside" should be done or which we should be prepared to do in the coming operations.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director

August 27, 1942

MEMORANDUM

Subject to the approval of The Joint Chiefs of Staff:

1. We are acquiring 40,000,000 francs in native currency - Tangerine, Arabian and Moroccan - to be held at various points as a reserve to finance the expenses of guerilla or other extraordinary action. We are buying up this reserve inconspicuously in small sums against our pledge to place free dollars in the United States available to certain beneficiaries in each case. These transactions are not reported, even in code.

2. Detailed arrangements should be made for wireless communications between our stations at Tangier and Gibraltar, on the one hand, and convoys, on the other, in order to transmit last minute intelligence regarding troop movements, defense measures being taken by Germany or by Vichy or by Spain.

boats for supplying guerrilla groups
the assaulting divisions.

4. We are bringing back to Vinh
gler a hydrographer whom we have had there,
captain of the Tug Boat and Salvage Company,
the Atlantic Coast of Morocco, whose services
well known to him. His services will be at
such time and in such manner as may be desired.

5. We should impress upon the
sity of setting up a powerful broadcasting
raltar to broadcast in French, Spanish and
Africa. This station has been partially in
not yet ready to operate because the British
taining wrong equipment. Such a station
cause the reception from stations in this
uncertain and too indistinct to be relied
station cannot be arranged for, then we
rangements with the B.B.C. to use their

-2-

3. Arrangements should be made with the Governor at Gibraltar for the earmarking of stores and small boats for supplying guerilla groups after the arrival of the assaulting divisions.

4. We are bringing back to Washington from Tangier a hydrographer whom we have had there. He has been captain of the Tug Boat and Salvage Company operating on the Atlantic Coast of Morocco, whose beaches and ports are well known to him. His services will be made available at such time and in such manner as may be desired.

5. We should impress upon the British the necessity of setting up a powerful broadcasting station at Gibraltar to broadcast in French, Spanish and Arabic to North Africa. This station has been partially installed, but is not yet ready to operate because the British erred in obtaining wrong equipment. Such a station is essential because the reception from stations in this country is too uncertain and too indistinct to be relied upon. If this station cannot be arranged for, then we must perfect arrangements with the B.B.C. to use their channels.

-3-

6. We have already taken up with Mr. Murphy at Algiers a proposal to have the French leaders select and send out the most influential person of their choice, who could be used to broadcast in French to the officers and civilians in North Africa prior to or at the moment of attack. There is needed a name that will carry weight with the people who live in the territory - a name that has not been impaired by identification with the B.B.C.-de Gaulist programs.

7. In the event that staff talks would be desired between the Americans and the leaders of the French separatist movement, this can be arranged through Mr. R. D. Murphy who should be here within the next few days.

8. We are preparing for submission and approval a promise to be made by our theatre commander to the French high commander in North Africa concerning payment of salaries and pensions of all French army and navy officers who join the revolt against the Vichy Government and open warfare against the Axis.

9. We are preparing to submit suggestions for

-4-

leaflets and posters to be distributed in French, Arabic and Spanish announcing the arrival of the American forces, the spirit of the French army and people of North Africa, and the assurance of foods, medicines and necessities.

Also, there should be determined what, if any, pledge of respect for the territory and neutrality should be given to the Spanish and French.

10. We here are strongly of the opinion that for aid and assistance to the assault commanders we should withdraw at an early date one of our agents from Algiers and one from Morocco to be available for each attacking party. I have talked with Colonel Eddy about this and asked him for his recommendations.

(a) For GYMNAST he recommends Vice-Consul Frederick P. Culbert, control officer at Casablanca, graduate of the Naval Academy, class of 1916. He resigned from the Navy in the early twenties and for many years was a business executive in France and Germany. It is recommended that he be given the rank of Commander in the Naval Reserve.

-5-

(b) For TORCH it is recommended that Captain John Crawford Knox, a reserve officer and now Vice-Consul and control officer at Algiers, be withdrawn. He is a graduate of St. Cyr and served in the French Army as a commissioned officer for many years. He is our principal organizer in Algiers and has many friends inside the French army and the French secret service. It is recommended that he be promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Reserve for this assignment.

I urge also that there be designated at Algiers and Morocco certain of our agents to take charge in the event that anything should happen to the above named officer or to the director at Tangier.

(c) To this end, upon Colonel Eddy's recommendation, we submit the name of Captain David W. King, U. S. Army Reserve, who has handled the detailed organization work in French Morocco. I recommend that he be promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Reserve for this assignment.

(b) For Algiers there is recommended Vice-Consul Brian M. Rounds, control officer at Oran, who has the full confidence of the leaders of the French Separatist Movement, of the British and Polish intelligence, and who knows personally our agents and sympathizers in the Province of Oran. Mr. Rounds was a captain in the U. S. Army in the last war, but resigned from service. I recommend that he be commissioned with the rank of Major.

The remaining control officers who should also be given rank of Navy rank in order to enable them to act as liaison officers upon the arrival of Allied troops, are recommended as follows:

(a) Captain W. Stafford Reid, control officer and Vice-Consul at Casablanca. It is recommended that he be given promotion to the rank of Major.

(b) The following should be given the rank of Captain in the Army or Lieutenant senior grade in the Navy: John W. Boyd, Algiers; Ridgeway E. Knight, Oran; Vice-Consul Utter, and Vice-

-7-

Consul Woodruff, both at Tunis.

Those control officers are men of maturity and experience, especially selected for the work that they have been doing. By remaining on the inactive list or by resigning their commissions, they have missed the automatic promotion they would otherwise have received long ago. It is felt that only by having them definitely placed in the Army and Navy can we take full advantage of their experience and their military contacts.

I recommend that in order to make his position secure, Colonel Eddy should be given the rank of Full Colonel. We plan to locate a Deputy Director at Gibraltar to take over in any emergency. This Deputy would have control of all our radio stations which communicate simultaneously with Tangier and Gibraltar.

11. It is proposed to have (a) available at our London office a representative of OSS on the psychological warfare side, to be at the disposition of the Theatre Commander; and (b) available for the commander of the assaulting troops a representative of the OSS, who is a member of the Subcommittee on Psychological Warfare, lived in France

-8-

or in Africa twelve years, speaks French with great facility and who is recognized as an authority on propaganda.

William J. Donovan

December 17th, 1941.

TO: QO

**DRAFT SUGGESTIONS FOR UNITED STATES COOPERATION
WITH THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE SERVICES IN FRENCH
NORTH AFRICA**

1. In order to coordinate the American Intelligence in French North Africa with that of the British, it is considered desirable:-

- (a) To establish one selected American Intelligence official who should have civilian status in the United States Consulates at Tangier, and who will be in direct, but discreet, touch with the head of the British Intelligence.
- (b) To have a reliable and experienced courier who could speak French to carry the American Pouch from the United States Consulates in Casablanca, Algiers and Tunis to Tangier.
- (c) To establish wireless communication between French North Africa and Tangier; from the operational point of view, Tunis at the present time is the most important point, with Casablanca a good second.
- (d) It is, therefore, suggested that every effort be made to establish wireless communication with Tunis. This will entail someone being designated in the United States Consulates to be in charge of the set and its operator, and to be responsible for passing Intelligence to Tangier.

2. Once courier communications are established on the lines suggested above, it will be possible without any further help to tap sources, which have already been established by the British. When the information has reached Tangier, it could be sorted out by the British and the American Intelligence Official in collaboration. (This arrangement will enable both Governments to receive more rapid and regular information than that which is already reaching the British Services in Tangier by somewhat circuitous routes.)

3. Details

(a) Wireless Transmitters.

It is possible that the United States would prefer to supply wireless transmitters themselves, as and when needed, but the British Services are prepared to supply these, at any rate to assist in launching the scheme, say at Tunis and Casablanca.

(b) Operators:

If the British sets (which are small, highly selective and generally made to make "directional finding" extremely difficult) are to be used, it would be necessary for the operators to have a short course, probably in New York, with British operators. Naturally, they would have to be hand-picked, not only as regards technical ability, but also as regards character and integrity. A great many of the difficulties which we have experienced in our work in France and French North Africa have been due to the presence, not of finding trained wireless operators, but of finding trained wireless operators who had also sufficient discretion and staunchness.

- 2 -

of character. It is almost inevitable that the operator, if he fails morally, is in a position to give away the greater part of the whole scheme.

(c) Courier:

The courier chosen should be able to speak French and, if possible, be trained in Intelligence work.

(d) Intelligence Representative in Tangier:

It is understood that the appointment has already been made, but it is again suggested that whoever comes in this capacity to Tangier should come as a civilian, and not as belonging to any of the Services. (This is owing to Spanish susceptibilities about other powers having representatives of their armed forces in Tangier.)

(e) Cooperation in Tangier:

There should be the closest cooperation between the man chosen by the American Intelligence and his British opposite number with due regard to the fact that their personal contacts should be carried out with extreme discretion. This arrangement would prevent the multiplication of Intelligence contacts between the United States and British authorities at Tangier, and constitutes in such a place a grave danger to security.

(f) Sources:

Certain sources of information, which have already been recruited and trained by the British in various French North Africa towns, could be put in contact with the United States' through "post boxes" and their report picked up by the courier on his round. Details of the manner in which this is done would have to be left entirely to the British and American Intelligence at Tangier.

4. It is essential that Intelligence Services should be limited to purely Intelligence work and should not be connected "in the field" with any aspects of sabotage or propaganda. It has been found that the methods of securing Intelligence are diametrically opposed to the methods employed in the sabotage and propaganda services by the very difference of their respective objectives. The courier and the Intelligence representatives, as well as any sources that may eventually be taken on, must clearly understand that their job lies in the realm of listening and observation and not in the realm of talking and action.

5. To sum up, the priority requirements seem to be:

- (a) An American civilian as American Intelligence Official in Tangier.
- (b) A courier.
- (c) A wireless set and operator in Tunis in charge of a subordinate official responsible to the American Intelligence Official in Tangier.

When once these three matters have been settled, and are in working order, then the scheme for Anglo-American Intelligence cooperation in French North Africa can readily be expanded on the following lines.

AZORESPROPOSAL FOR PENETRATION OPERATIONS

(a) As a result of negotiations extending over some weeks time the GOVERNMENT OF PORTUGAL has agreed to grant the concession for internal air service operations in THE AZORES, to an old established shipping undertaking controlled by an Azorean family, which already handles 70% of the business of the Islands.

(b) The head of this business is an Anti-Axis Portuguese, who is known to be completely reliable and who has already been of considerable service to the Allied Cause.

(c) He is prepared to initiate immediately the necessary steps to establish bases for the air service operations contemplated, which would provide ideal natural cover for extensive penetration of the Islands for special defensive purposes.

(d) It would be necessary to supply him with some equipment, say two amphibians, and to provide the financial requirements to conduct the overt and covert operations.

(e) The aircraft should be enroute at the earliest possible opportunity, and certain skilled personnel selected for special purposes should accompany the owners to the Islands.

(f) Our Portuguese friend referred to has control of the ships which would carry the necessary

unloading could be done without undue inquiry as to certain parts of the equipment accompanying the aircraft.

(g) Due to the predominant position in the Islands of our Portuguese friend, he would be in a position to very quickly obtain local assistance without undue risk.

(h) He could also recruit pilots and technicians in numbers without attracting unusual attention, as the operation of the air lines by him has been long expected, and it is known from public utterances he has made in the past that his only desire is to be a pioneer of air service in the Islands, as his family before him were in shipping, and that he does not expect the operation to make a profit for some time.

(i) Therefore, all the necessary cover is provided for extensive penetration operations, and, in addition, the most difficult problem usually encountered in such an operation, namely, means of transportation and infiltration, are provided for in a form which avoids the likelihood of undue attention and suspicion being attracted to the activities of the penetration force.

(j) The cost involved would be, roughly, the cost of two aircraft and auxiliary equipment, and airframe construction, say \$500,000; overt and covert working capital, say \$200,000 - a total of \$700,000, to which must be added the cost of any special "staples" it is

December 26, 1941

Honorable Harold D. Smith
Director of the Budget
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Smith:

It will be necessary to obtain funds from the Budget Bureau, by reason of the approval by the State and War Departments of a project which the President authorized subject to such approval.

The project relates to certain special activities proposed in the Azores, a brief statement of which is as follows:

(a) As a result of negotiations extending over some weeks' time, the Government of Portugal has agreed to grant the concession for internal air service operations in the Azores, to an old established shipping undertaking controlled by an Azorean family, which already handles 90% of the business of the islands.

(b) The head of this business is an Anti-Axis Portuguese, who is known to be completely reliable and

who has already been of considerable service to the Allied Cause.

(c) He is prepared to initiate immediately the necessary steps to establish bases for the air service operations contemplated, which would provide a natural cover for extensive penetration of the Islands for special defensive purposes.

(d) It would be necessary to supply him with some equipment, say two amphibians, and to provide the financial requirements to conduct the overt and covert operations.

(e) The aircraft should be enroute at the earliest possible opportunity, and certain skilled personnel selected for special purposes should accompany the owners to the Islands.

(f) Our Portuguese friend referred to has control of the ships which would carry the necessary equipment to the Azores from the United States, and unless it could be done without undue inquiry as to certain parts of the equipment accompanying the aircraft.

(g) Due to the predominant position in the Islands of our Portuguese friend, he would be in a position to

-2-

obtain very quickly local assistance without undue risk.

(h) He could also recruit pilots and technicians in numbers without attracting unusual attention, as the operation of the air lines by him has been long expected, and it is known from public utterances he has made in the past that his only desire is to be a pioneer of air service in the Islands, as his family before him were in shipping, and that he does not expect the operation to make a profit for some time.

(i) Therefore, all the necessary cover is provided for extensive penetration operations, and, in addition, the most difficult problem usually encountered in such an operation, namely, means of transportation and infiltration, are provided for in a form which avoids the likelihood of undue attention and suspicion being attracted to the activities of the penetration force.

(j) The cost involved would be, roughly, the cost of two aircraft and ancillary equipment, and airbase construction, say \$200,000; over and covert

working capital, say \$200,000 - a total of \$500,000,
to which must be added the cost of any special "stores"
it is possible to introduce in quantity.

In accordance with the direction of the President,
I am pursuing this matter with the British. General H.H.
Arnold, who was present at the conference with the Chief
of Staff, General Marshall, has designated an air officer
to assist.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

M:CC

December 26, 1941

Honorable Harold D. Smith
Director of the Budget
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Smith:

I am making a request for additional funds, by reason of the following:

Upon the direction of the President, I took up with General Marshall and with Mr. Sumner Welles the problem of getting necessary preparatory and conditioning work done in the Cape Verde Islands and in French North Africa.

This will involve a K&L project on the S.O.S. hotel and will necessitate the hiring of men and the purchase of many materials. At the suggestion of General Marshall, the details will be worked out by General Stillwell, who is to have command of the project.

I do not need to elaborate to you the need, not only for funds, but for speed in such an undertaking.

-2-

So far as we can estimate now, we should be able to obtain sufficient material for a sum of \$500,000. This should include the obtaining of mater, the transportation, the purchase of demolition material, and the conduct of operations for a period of two months. If that is extended, or if a larger project cannot be put through at the end of that time, more funds will be needed.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan

M:CC

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

August 5, 1942

FROM: David Bruce
 TO: Mr. James Murphy

SECRET
 OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Colonel Hugh Butler has reported to me that, in a conference yesterday, Colonel Donovan stated that he had been in conference with Admiral Leahy and the Admiral asked him to submit all available military information relative to French Northwest Africa, Morocco, and West Africa.

I am attaching a copy of a memorandum prepared in this office yesterday containing information in regard to French and Spanish Morocco. We will furnish you with similar information regarding the other regions mentioned as soon as it can be compiled.

AB

D. B.

August 5, 1942
We called today today asking that he supply us with all information that is now lacking in these areas. The cases were very specific, as you will see by reading it. It was and is broken for obvious reasons.
AB

SECRET

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC

Harold J. Coolidge, Jr.

August 4, 1941

Mr. Hugh Wilson

Moroccan Information Desired

This report enlarges on my memorandum of August 3, 1941, is based on a conversation with Sherman Kent, the Chief of the African Section, R and A, who has recently completed a special report on French and Spanish Morocco at the request of Colonel Donovan.

1. Beaches. It would be highly desirable to obtain a preliminary appraisal of certain beaches which might be used for landing purposes in Morocco, particularly those at Agadir, Casablanca, Cape Blin, Mogador, Marragan, Casa Blanca, Rabat, Tangier, Ceuta and Melilla. The O.C. is in possession of a report on beaches is largely taken from the I.S.I. report of August 1941. Location and description of these beaches.
2. Harbors and Dock Information. Harbors in French and Spanish Morocco should be compared with the data already assembled by I.S.I. Such a report should contain information on the width, length, and depth, the length of the wharf, the depth of water at wharf side (at low water, high tide); the covered and uncovered storage space on the docks, the track or road layout at the wharf, information on unloading cranes, including capacity, type of crane and source of power; the amount of labor that might be available for helping to unload vessels and the amount of labor that could be recruited in the neighborhood of the ports in question.
3. Railroads. A recent conductor's report on the tableau de charges, for railway lines in French and Spanish Morocco is greatly needed. These give information on the location of sidings, location of water spouts, etc. It is necessary to have an inventory of rolling stock, freight cars (type, empty and carrying capacity, type and description of loading device, location of opening) and locomotives (type, arrangement, number, tractive effort, details of construction, loaded weight and year put into service); what tracks are

SECRET

Mr. Earl Wilson - 2

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
August 4, 1942

in operation in Spanish Morocco. We should like information on railroad sidings, particularly their extended length and number and location. We also need information on the length, number and location of sidings on the line from Fez to Tangier.

4. Air Fields of Spanish Morocco. Information is greatly needed on this subject. We only have a report based on I.C.I.S. information listing the following fields: 28 miles north east of Tetuan, 10 miles south by east of Melilla, 10 miles south east of Larache, 9 miles south of Alhucemas and 9 miles south west of Tangier. Recent information on these fields is highly desirable and location and equipment of other fields greatly needed. We are the meteorological installations at the air fields and are they equipped to furnish essential weather information to fliers, wind direction, barometer, etc.


5. Air Field at Port Lyautey. A new field is in certain preparation at this port, with concrete runways to be completed in November 1942. A report on the progress of this development is needed.

6. Railroad at Safi. Information is wanted on the railroad which runs from the town to the harbor. Does this pass through a tunnel? Is it double tracked with sidings, etc?

7. Telephony. Recent information on the telephone system in French and Spanish Morocco is greatly needed, if possible with a map indicating telephone lines at present in operation.

8. Tribal Antagonism. Information is needed on local and tribal antagonism, the number of natives in each group, their possible willingness to fight if sufficiently aroused and properly led.

H. J. C., Jr.



PORTSMOUTH TO CANARY ISLANDS

SOUNDINGS IN FATHOMS

LIGHTS

R C. *Recher Direction Finder Station*R. E. N. Radich@ucm.edu

Magnetic variation curves av. for 1935

Only the principal lights are shown, as this chart

Corrected to N.M.

Year	No.	Paragraph	Year	No.	Paragraph



EUROPE AND AFRICA

PORTSMOUTH TO CANARY ISLANDS

Compiled from various sources

SOUNDINGS IN FATHOMS

*C. clay, Co coral, G gravel, M. mud, G.ooose S sand, Sh shells, St stones,
cs coarse, fs fine, hrd hard, rky rocky, sft soft,
bk black, dk dark, gy grey, rd red, wh white, y. yellow*

LIGHTS

F. fixed, Fl flashing, Occ occulting, Alt. alternating, Cp group
R. red, W. white, G. green, B. blue, sec. sector, (U) unwatched

R. C. Radio Compass Finder system

R. Bn. Radiobeacon

Magnetic variation curves are for 1935

Only the principal lights are shown in this chart

No wrecks are shown in this chart

Natural Scale 1:240,000 at date

33°
32°
31°
30°
29°
28°
27°
26°
25°
24°
23°
22°
21°
20°
19°
18°
17°
16°
15°
14°
13°
12°
11°
10°
9°
8°
7°
6°
5°
4°
3°
2°
1°
0°

SECRETMEMORANDUM

August 14, 1942

FROM: DONALD Q. COSTER

TO: COLONEL DONOVAN

With Reference to North African Operations

In planning any proposed operation by United States sea, land, and air forces in French North Africa, one thought in my opinion is of paramount importance: i.e., that the landings should take place on the west coast of Morocco and not on the coast of Algeria on the Mediterranean side. There have been considerable arguments both pro and con on this question, but to my mind the Mediterranean operation would be asking for trouble for the following two reasons. First, our forces would have to pass through the Strait of Gibraltar and in doing so the element of surprise would be completely lost, as well as the fact that our ships would be exposed to the fire from the heavy gun emplacements on the Spanish side. The second and most obvious reason is that a landing operation on the Algerian coast would expose our rear and left flanks to continual harassing by strong Axis forces.

As detailed on the attached map, our proposed operation on the west coast should entail three separate landings. The

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first and main landing should be at the port of AGADIR on the excellent stretch of beaches extending 31 kilometers north and 16 kilometers south of the town. The secondary landings should be at SIFI and PORT LYAUTEY. The principal French Moroccan port of Casablanca should most definitely be avoided in the initial operations because of the strong units of the French fleet presently stationed there. These units would most certainly resist any attempted intervention on our part. It is my opinion that these same units would have to be put out of action at the exact time our operation commences, as the ships would most certainly put to sea and cause no end of trouble up and down the coast as well as acting as raiders in order to disrupt our lines of communication and supply.

The principal landing at AGADIR and subsequent thrust inland would insure us of the support of the strongest of all the Arab tribes, namely, the Sous. The fighting men of this tribe are commanded by French officers whose sympathies are most definitely with us, and there is no doubt that these

Arab tribes in French North Africa have tremendous respect for the fighting qualities of the Sous warriors, and the news that these are on our side would have an electric effect on all the other Arabs throughout French North Africa and would

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first and main landing should be at the port of AGADIR on the excellent stretch of beaches extending 31 kilometers north and 16 kilometers south of the town. The secondary landings should be at SAFA and PORT LYAUTEY. The principal French Moroccan port of Casablanca should most definitely be avoided in the initial operations because of the strong units of the French fleet presently stationed there. These units would most certainly resist any attempted intervention on our part. It is my opinion that these same units would have to be put out of action at the exact time our operation commences, as the ships would most certainly put to sea and cause no end of trouble up and down the coast as well as acting as raiders in order to disrupt our lines of communication and supply.

The principal landing at AGADIR and subsequent turns inland would insure us of the support of the strongest of all the Arab tribes, namely, the Sous. The fighting men of this tribe are commanded by French officers whose sympathies are most definitely with us, and there is no doubt that these native troops would aid and abet our effort. All the other Arab tribes in French North Africa have tremendous respect for the fighting qualities of the Sous warriors, and the news that these men were on our side would have an electric effect on all the other Arabs throughout French North Africa and would

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certainly tend to make them fall along in line.

Briefly, the main advantages that would accrue to us through the other two landings are as follows: the landing at SAFI and thrust inland would serve to cut the main railroad line between Marrakesh and Casablanca, which is of extreme importance from a supply angle. The landing at PORT LYAUTEY and subsequent thrusts eastward to Fez and the south would have the dual purpose of reaching the ancient Arab capital and center of learning (Fez) as well as cutting off the important and strategic present-day capital, Rabat, from both Meknes and Fez.

Donald A. Coster